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In the sixteenth century, Oxford University had a statute that any of its students
or professors “who did not follow Aristotle faithfully were liable to a fine of five
shillings for every point of divergence.”
—Graham Midgley1
I
n September 2000, a book appeared challenging the popular perception
that Americans have always been a heavily armed people. Arming America:
The Origins of a National Gun Culture questioned a series of assumptions about Americans’
relationship with guns by examining a wide array of evidence across three centuries. The
book came under sustained assault nearly a year before its appearance. Along the way a num-
ber of accusations were made against the book’s scholarship and its author. Most of these accu-
sations focus on the three paragraphs and one table dealing with probate records, though
other charges emerged, primarily on the web. As the author of Arming America, I would
rather not engage in the highly political and personal tone of these attacks which often say
more about the critic than about the content of the book. As the goal of this tract is the fur-
therance of scholarship, I prefer to simply answer each of the charges of falsification in turn.
For that reason, each accusation is quoted without attribution, so as to avoid further personal-
izing this debate.
Not all critiques are equal. I hope that it is evident that many accusations made against
Arming America have no relation to the text but are rather based on what some people
assume or imagine the book says. A great many attacks appear to have been motivated by
political agendas. Unfortunately, the polemical static obscured a number of legitimate criti-
cisms, and I did not respond adequately to each and every allegation. This document is an
effort to respond to every specific criticism of the book. Many criticisms of this book have
either correctly identified errors or offered an alternative reading of the source. I welcome the
former, which has led to the publication of an improved second edition. While there were
errors in the first edition, none of them was made intentionally or with any design to mislead
the reader. The latter form of critique, alternative interpretations, are important and helpful,
forming the essence of scholarly debate. Hopefully these critiques will inspire further
research, for, as Arming America attempted to make clear, America’s gun heritage is a sur-
Chapter Oneprisingly underexplored aspect of our history. As stated in the introduction to the book, I have
only scratched the surface of the documentary record, and the vast amounts of material, such
as military records, demand further exploration. There is certainly room for disagreement
about the significance of the evidence provided by Arming America, but my goal in writing it
was to present a rigorous and accurate historical account and a reasonable, though controver-
sial, interpretation of the historical record. 
Not for a moment do I mean to suggest that Arming America is free of error; it is likely
that no work of scholarship is free from error. The individual scholar thus has a responsibility
to correct any mistakes in his or her work, as I have consistently endeavored to do. In his biog-
raphy, Truman, David McCullough quotes a memo from General Thomas Handy of George
Marshall’s staff as stating that the military expected 500,000 to one million casualties in the
invasion of Japan.2As it turned out, the memo was actually written by former President Her-
bert Hoover and General Handy’s covering memo dismisses the prediction as ridiculous. The
Army’s highest casualty figure for the invasion was 67,000. Though McCullough acknowl-
edged the error, it has never been corrected in Truman, which is still available in bookstores.
The failure to correct that mistake in print has had major consequences, as it is often quoted
to justify America’s decision to drop two atomic bombs on Japan and was repeatedly cited in
the debate over the cancelled Enola Gay exhibit at the Smithsonian.3 Even the finest scholars,
and I place McCullough in that camp, make mistakes. However, acknowledging an error is
not enough, it must be corrected. From the first appearance of Arming America, I have done
my best to correct any errors, as I do here and in the revised edition of the book.
Above all else, I hope that anyone attempting to evaluate Arming America will actually
read the book. This may seem a self-evident request, and any author would like to have peo-
ple read his or her book, but I believe that much of the criticism of Arming America is based
on misinformation spread on the web. 
Arming America was the product of ten years of research in scores of archives.4 It exam-
ines the development of America’s gun culture from the first European settlements through
1877. The book’s thesis is that the gun culture which is now so widely taken for granted in the
United States has not always been a “given” of life in America, but developed during the mid-
nineteenth century. An increase in the production of firearms under federal supervision in the
1850s set the groundwork for the slaughter of the Civil War. That war generated a massive
increase in the demand for guns, while training millions of American men in the use of
firearms. This is not a simple story, and Arming America is a rather complex book. I aimed to
explore a broad diversity of experience over three centuries and to avoid sweeping generaliza-
tions about what Americans believed as a collective, giving attention to regional, class, racial,
and gender differences.
Starting with the earliest use of firearms in Europe, paying particular attention to politi-
cal and cultural trends in England, Arming America tracks firearms to North America. I
attempt to show the gun’s range of uses and limitations in the daily life of colonial America, as
well as the effort of colonial governments to acquire and preserve sufficient firearms for their
defense. The fourth chapter, which several critics have suggested contains the most original
contribution of the book, argues that the Eastern Woodlands Indians constituted America’s
first gun culture. Moving from the attitudes of North America’s natives to wilderness war-
2 Michael Bellesilesfare, I follow the lead of many fine military historians in matching the myth and reality of the
militia in the eighteenth century. The American Revolution serves as the practical test of these
historical arguments, as the militia displayed occasional moments of astounding heroism and
a steady pattern of avoidance. I do maintain that the militia’s hesitance to do battle was per-
fectly rational, given the shortage of firearms and the general ignorance of their proper use. It
is certainly the case that the military and political leaders of the patriot cause worked con-
stantly to acquire sufficient firearms for their struggle with England. Since there were no gun
manufactories in North America, they had no choice but to turn to Europe, finding willing
suppliers in France and the Netherlands. 
Chapter 7 is the pivot of the book. In this and the two following chapters, I endeavor to
show how the new federal government sought constantly to encourage arms production, pro-
mote the better organization and arming of the militia, and develop a way of training a large
number of men in the use of firearms while avoiding an expensive standing army. These
efforts failed miserably, as the War of 1812 amply demonstrated. Meanwhile, state govern-
ments walked a fine line between the perceived need to supply arms to reliable citizens for
internal defense and the desire to prevent those arms from falling into the hands of feared
classes—Indians, blacks, the poor, and political radicals. I focus on a number of domestic
political disputes in order to uncover the use of firearms and the level of violence. The cre-
ation of a hunting subculture in the late 1820s and the erratic progress of uniformed militia
companies point to a growing yet still limited interest in firearms. The book’s last chapter
focuses on the significant improvements in firearms technology and production in the 1850s
and 1860s, as well as the traumatic and decisive experience of the Civil War, to discover the
origins of America’s gun culture. I like the way Carl Bogus has put it, that Arming America
“explores the development of an American gun culture by following the hardware.” The
book does attempt to focus on the guns, to find “how many there were, who made them, who
had them, where they were kept, and how they were used.”5
This work offered a reading of America’s fascination with firearms that was clearly at
variance with received tradition. This contrary thesis was presented in the spirit of explo-
ration, with the hope that other historians would be interested enough to pursue the subject as
well and engage with the findings of this author. Historians, like all scholars, formulate
hypotheses to explain some aspect of the past, and then test them against what we can know or
think we know. If these tests stand, then the hypothesis may also stand, for a time (for no his-
torical theory lasts for very long). But the failure of the facts to fit every aspect of a thesis is no
cause for despair, for we have learned something even from such a disagreement between
interpretation and evidence. More significantly, historians have always disagreed on what
specific facts mean and how they should be read. The historical profession thrives on such dis-
agreements. What may prove deadly to scholarship is the assumption, in the absence of any
other evidence, that any error or sloppiness in the recording of these facts is part of some effort
to mislead the reader. Such an approach may ultimately have a chilling effect on scholarship,
especially on those scholars who dare to step outside the normative and approved paths of
inquiry.
What follows is an effort to respond to every specific accusation against Arming America
that has been brought to my attention. Arming America contains 1407 footnotes covering 126
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There is little doubt that with the publication of the revised edition of Arming America new
charges against the book will appear, including, in all probability, the repetition of charges
confronted in this pamphlet. Hopefully fair-minded people will verify these charges by look-
ing for themselves at the source documents and at what Arming America actually says. 
4 Michael BellesilesProbate Records
But the whole point of this exercise [attacking the probate records] is to
discredit Bellesiles’ book without expressly dealing with the arguments. 
—Robert Spitzer1
T
he most significant and oft-repeated criticism of Arming America con-
cerns the probate materials. Many critics maintain that “the entire argu-
ment of the book is based on one thousand probate records.” This statement is incorrect. It is
true that I had initially been fascinated with probate records as a source, and for years I would
stop at every county courthouse I was near and ask if they had any probate inventories from
the antebellum period. These materials open a window on the dynamic nature of the early
American economy and the structure of the household economy. However, as I presented my
findings at historical conferences over the 1990s, I was persuaded that probate records are
deeply flawed as a source. Academic conferences are supposed to accomplish precisely this
task, helping scholars clarify their ideas and discover what is strongest and weakest in their
evidence. Many historians pointed out that a great deal depended on the dedication of the
executors. Theirs was a complex job, that of listing and giving a monetary valuation to every
single item in the possession of the deceased at the time of death. Many of them must have
been tempted to take shortcuts. Additionally, except for when goods are auctioned, there is no
indication as to how the executors arrived at their valuation of goods inventoried. There are
also many problems with the documents themselves, not the least of which is deciphering
them. Some executors possessed a beautiful flowing script, others had the most awful and
barely legible handwriting; prior to the 1820s all spelled erratically. But the primary problem
with probate records is their built-in class bias. Generally only property holders were invento-
ried; far too often the poorest were buried without any concern for the distribution of their
few goods.2
Because of the many conversations I had with scholars over the years about probate
records I decided to make little use of them in Arming America. Nonetheless, they remain sig-
nificant sources, providing some indication of how many guns were in private hands in
America and in what condition those guns were kept. As a consequence, this material appears
Chapter Twoin four paragraphs and a sentence (pp. 74, 109–110, 266–67, and 386). I tried in the book to
indicate, as briefly as possible, the limitations of probate records, which are biased by class,
race, gender, local standards, and the personalities of the executors. It is very clear that I erred
in not devoting far more space to a full consideration of a source that would arouse the interest
of readers. The ensuing controversy has led to a number of valuable insights into the use of
probate materials, which will hopefully be of some benefit to future scholars. I have posted on
my web page an essay I wrote some years back on the uses of probate materials. Further mate-
rials and a name-by-name listing of the probate records examined may be found on that site.3
The following are the primary accusations concerning the probate materials.
1The Flood
The problems with my probate notes began on April 2, 2000. On that day the pipes in
Emory University’s Bowden Hall (where the history department is located) burst and flooded
the building, doing serious damage to nearly every office and an estimated million dollars in
damage to the building.4The ceiling of my office (222Bowden Hall) collapsed and the result-
ing flood turned a dozen of the legal pads on which I had taken notes into unreadable pulp
(these were not all my notes, but those with statistics which I planned to enter onto my com-
puter in the fall when I returned from Europe). Professor James V. Melton, who was the only
person in the building at the time, characterized the ensuing rush of waters, which lasted sev-
eral hours, as “like being on the Titanic.” Professor Mark Ravina described the wreckage of
papers on his desk as “a sodden mix of waterlogged pulp and ceiling tiles,” and stated that
these documents had been rendered “undecipherable and unreadable.” 
Despite the fact that these events were well known and well described, many critics
charged that no flood had occurred.5More commonly, I was criticized for persisting in the use
of pencil and legal pads in the last decade of the twentieth century. Many people charged that
no serious scholar uses anything but computer programs for note taking, while others found it
difficult to believe that I kept my notes in my office. It is true that I stuck to the anachronism
of pencil and paper until I purchased a laptop computer in 2001. As the History Department’s
undergraduate director for seven years, I was in my office five days a week in order to be
available for students and did nearly all my work there. It is further correct that I had just
assumed that my notes were safe in Bowden Hall. I had no way of knowing that when the
flood came that the ceiling would collapse right on to that chair, the ceiling tiles turning into a
white mud on top of my notes. 
So ruined were these notes that it was not initially clear which materials had been lost,
especially as I was in Europe teaching and conducting research over the summer. But upon
my return I determined that my notes on these probate records had been destroyed and posted
a message to that effect on several historical e-mail lists in September 2000. I do not know that
there is any connection between my posting that information and the sudden attacks on me
for not having my notes for the probate records, but it was almost eerie the way that several
hostile web sites shifted their ground from denying the validity of probate records as a source
to insisting on their centrality to Arming America and my obvious (and admitted) failings as a
scholar for not having put my data on a computer. 
6 Michael BellesilesI have tried on my web site to open a scholarly conversation about probate records. Going
over this material in a new way, I have undertaken an extended project to not simply replicate
my probate findings but to expand the evidential base. Several scholars criticized my use of
the sample set method in Arming America. I had counted the presence of guns in the probate
records for one and two year periods from forty different counties, an approach I now see to
be fraught with possible biases. Inspired by Cornelia Dayton’s work,6 I am now researching
and posting on the web ten to thirty year periods from specific counties, reproducing every
firearm and book listed in every probate file in those years. Books are included because I am
interested in the subject of literacy and reading habits in early America, and it is also a topic
that has garnered attention from many scholars over the past decade, making such a database
of some wider use. Additionally, these lists serve as a useful indicator of how different probate
collections work, providing an indication of the thoroughness of the executor and aid in
understanding the idiosyncratic nature of these inventories. Probate records are very compli-
cated and difficult to read in their original condition; the handwriting is often abysmal,
spelling erratic and confusing, the paper often smudged with age or burned, and the entirety
subject to the patience and dedication of the executors. I have invited other scholars interested
in the subject to contribute materials for posting on this site. There is no effort here to prove
any argument with this site, but rather to provide information that may be of value to histori-
ans. Additionally, I no longer think it is the number of guns that matters so much, as the
recorded quality of the guns, an issue worthy of further discussion.
It is perfectly reasonable for scholars to be concerned over the destruction of these notes,
which is precisely why I informed the various e-mail lists of the accident. They are also correct
to wonder why no one else has replicated my findings. But then, to my knowledge, no one else
has looked specifically for firearms. For instance, Gloria Main conflated all possible weapons
and accoutrements into a category “arms, armor.”7 Even that is more than all but a few
unpublished theses have done. Sometimes the lack of interest in firearms is rather striking.
Margaret B. Schiffer in her study of 10,788 probate inventories from Chester County, Penn-
sylvania, has lists of colors used in cloth but does not mention a single gun.8 It is regrettable
that the money and energy committed to investigating me could not have been devoted to aid-
ing me in replicating the lost material. Hopefully this debate will inspire many scholars to
look more closely at these valuable, though limited, documents.
2The Location of Probate Materials
Somehow the story spread that I claimed to have done all or most of my research at the
National Archives center in East Point, Georgia. I did not research original probate records at
the National Archives center in East Point, Georgia. Neither my book nor my web site
(posted in September 2000) gives that location for the probate materials, most of which are in
county courthouses, as most American historians know. Nor did I ever tell anyone at any con-
ference or in any interview at any time that the probate records are located at the National
Archives, for they are not. Rather, at every opportunity I denied that I had read original pro-
bate materials at this archive. Nor does my essay on probate sources mention the National
Archives. Microfilms of probate materials, which are not always complete, may be borrowed
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used the National Archive’s microfilm readers to read some probate records that I brought
with me. I do not believe that use violates any federal regulation or known standard of schol-
arship. I used these readers for the simple reason that I thought they were easier to read from
than those in Emory’s library, and also to break up the tedious task of going through hundreds
of pages of microfilm material having nothing to do with probate in the National Archives’
collection.
3The San Francisco Records
My web site did, I fear, contain an error. As a consequence of the destruction of my pro-
bate notes, I had to reconstruct the location of the forty different probate districts I examined
from memory, which may have been a mistake. It may have been better to have waited to list
the locations of these probate records until I had a chance to revisit each archive. Nonetheless,
each of those citations has been verified by my critics and apparently all but one is correct.
That one is for the sources I labeled San Francisco. I have posted photocopies from three of
these files on my web site and they are clearly headed “San Francisco County Probate,”
though there is evidence that they are in fact Contra Costa County records, which is across the
bay from San Francisco. It does not affect the statistics I gathered whether these dozen pro-
bate records are from Contra Costa or San Francisco County, and no one has disputed that
fact. My memory was that I read these dozen probate files one morning in 1994 in a court-
house storeroom. Since they are currently located in the Contra Costa Historical Society, some
people assumed that I had not read the documents in question. But a thorough investigation
revealed that in 1994 these documents were in fact stored in the county courthouse, as I cor-
rectly recalled. The probate inventories have a wonderful phrase before the appraisers’ signa-
tures, which acknowledged their fallibility and may serve as a useful guide when using
probate materials: “Errors excepted.”
4The Vermont Records
A data set for the Vermont probate records is circulating on the web that purports to dis-
prove the data set listed on my web site (hereafter the former will be referred to as the alterna-
tive database). Most people are unaware that often more than one source exists for a county’s
probate records. There were probate districts as well as county courts, probate docket books as
well as files, and also auction records, which provide the most accurate measurement of the
value of goods. It is also important to emphasize the distinction between probate inventories
and probate files. The inventories are generally lists of goods thought to belong to the
deceased, while the files, especially in the northern states, often contain a great deal more
information. Wills, lists of debts and credits, actual notes of hand, comments by the adminis-
trators of the estate, challenges to the division of the estate, subpoenas and testimony, letters,
and all sorts of scraps of papers appear in files.9 It is necessary to examine the entire probate
file in order to gain an accurate portrait of any estate; hence the need to actually visit the
archives in order to read these files.
8 Michael BellesilesWherever possible, I used the original files and auction records. For instance, take the
first example offered from the alternative Vermont probate records, that of Elnathan Hubbel.
My data set lists Hubbel owning a gun valued at £2, 8s, and another at £1. My source was the
files in the Bennington Courthouse basement, where I worked for two months. The alterna-
tive database relies on the District Probate Court Book, also known as the Probate Record
Books or the Minute Books. Note the difference: one gun at 48 shillings (which equals £2, 8s,
as I recorded) and the other gun at 18 shillings, two shillings less than my record reported.
The difference may be explained by the inclusion of auction records in the original files, so
that a gun evaluated at 18s sold for £1. But the perceived error here is that I overvalued a
firearm, which would be what social scientists call “an error against interest.” The more
important point to note, as was recorded by Emory University’s committee of inquiry, is that
one database does not disprove another database, and that these two collections are based not
only on different records, but occasionally on different counties. 
There may be names in the Minute Books that do not correspond to files, which may
explain why there are so many names in the alternative database that do not appear in my
database. One aspect of the difficulty of using these records is revealed by the fact that many
names are misspelled. For instance, Captain Stephen Fray in the alternative database should
be Captain Stephen Fay, a prominent figure in early Vermont. The misreading of a name is
indicative of how easy it is to make a mistake in using these handwritten, decaying docu-
ments. However, I would not accuse anyone who has made such an error of deliberate fraud. I
have also noticed a disagreement in dates for many of these files, some by as many as seven
years. I have worked on the assumption that we are not talking about two different people,
even if the dates are that far apart, for the settlement of estates often took many years, even
decades. It is possible that inventories listed in the Minute Books as 1789 or 1790 may have
appeared later in the files so that I missed them. A further explanation of this discrepancy is
that I looked at several files that did not contain inventories, and so did not include them on
my list. It may be that the Minute Books contain inventories for these people. At the very least
it seems that neither of these two data sets is inclusive of all the files. 
Based on the alternative database, the following people have guns that I did not find in
their probate files: 
Bennington: John Armstrong, John Hodgkinson, David Barber, Luther
Lawrence, Reverend Jedediah Dewey, Samuel Hunt, and William
Hendricks; 
Hartford: Oliver Farnsworth and Joseph Smalley;
Manchester: John Sherman, William Searle, and Elijah Galusha (or
Golusha);
Marlboro: Charles Phelps.
I have no record of a probate file for any of the following people who are listed in the
alternative database as having guns: 
Bennington: Amos Fairchild, Levi Morgan, Benjamin Fray [probably Fay],
Jonathan Moon, and Abner Drinkwater;
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Alexander Miller, Phillip Smith, Perez Woods, Thomas Pitkin, Charles
William Jr., Joseph Bates, and Billa Gray;
Manchester: Benjamin Rose, John Grimel, Lemuel Buck, Alaph Leaven, and
Jonathan Hay;
Marlboro: William Sears, Thomas Sergent, Francis Whitmore, and Richard
Weatherbee;
Rutland: Ezra Mead, Eleazer Davis, and not a single one of the fifteen names
in book 2;
Windsor: not one of the nine names in the two Windsor books.
The following people listed on the alternative database as not having guns do not appear
in my database:
Bennington: John Fray [perhaps John Fay, who does appear on my list], Icha-
bod Sparrow Paine [my list has Ichabod S. Paine Jr.], John Robbins,
Stephen Scorial, Jeremiah Willoughby [my list includes his father, who
died in 1771], Capt. John Scott, Luther Stibbons, William Carde, Josiah
Perry, Jonathan Cunningham, Thomas Haynes, Dan Howlett, Abner
Chaffee, Spencer Niles, Bethiah Kinsman, and Asa Alger;
Manchester: Samuel Pitman, John B. Wirmage, Nathan Weller, Benjamin
Barney, Eliakim Weller, Ara Rose, Ira Hawley, Caleb Newcomb, Capt.
David Bates, Gideon Barber, Capt. Elisha Wales, Richard Sackett,
Amaziah Avents, William Wiley, Capt. Jekiel Hawley, and Alexander
McLowry;
Rutland: Joshua Woodard, Jebediah [sic] Mise, Thamer Horcford, Garth
Beal, James Francies, Samuel McGee, Stephen Nicols, William Roberts,
Thomas McConnel, John Cobham, Marshall Newton, Odel Squires,
George Robins, Robert Gastilow, Noah Wait, Daniel Sherber, and
Samuel Ladd;
Marlboro: Perez Stockwell, Jonathan Hutchins, Jonathan Herrington, Capt.
John Kathan, Ephraim Weatherbee, Charles Evans, John Butler, Sarah
Stockwell, Lucy Willard, and Benjamin Ray;
Hartford: Abel Curtis, Daniel Pike, Joshua Slaton, Jonathan King, Joab
Hoifing, Benjamin Swinton, Nathan Roberts, Asa Jones, William
Hunter, John Searles, Robert Gates, Isaac Williams, and Calvin
Parkhurst;
Windsor: Moses Gile, Joseph Stack, Samuel Rowley, Jonathan Tarbell,
Matthew Patrick, William Philips, Joseph M. Neal, Samuel Litch,
William Jones, Peter Leavons, Sariah Green, Lucy Bates, and Bisbee
Thomson.
The alternative database includes eighteen people from Orange County, Vermont, a
county that I did not include in my database. There is one instance where I assume that this
data set is citing the same estate twice, John Smith of Bennington. Otherwise there is a second
John Smith whom I do not have on my list. I know that several of the people listed in this
database as not having inventories have them in the probate files. Thus the alternative data-
base states that John Nichols of Rutland County has “no items listed,” while my notes indicate
that he had “a gun £1, 3 bayonets 4s6,” as well as “a spelling book 2s.” Here again we have a
10 Michael Bellesilesgood indication of how different sources on the same person can contain different informa-
tion.
There are 64 names on the alternative database that are listed as owning guns that I do
not record as having guns; however, 51 (88.5 percent) of these 64 names do not appear on my
database at all. Additionally, as indicated above, there are 85names of people who do not own
firearms who do not appear on my list. If we add these 136 names to the 312 on my web site,
the total number of probated estates would increase to 448. Adding the 64 additional estates
with firearms to the 45 in my database increases the total to 109, or 24.3 percent. Let me note
that I get a different total from the alternative database, as in the eighteenth century a “fire-
lock” generally meant the lock mechanism to a firearm and is not in and of itself a gun. How-
ever, that is a minor point of disagreement.
The alternative database states that the Gloucester County records do not exist. They do
exist and are in the County Clerk’s Office in Chelsea, Vermont (in the old vault when I looked
at them in 1984). Gloucester County was initially part of New York, a subject discussed in my
book, Revolutionary Outlaws.
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When you work in the archives, you’re far from home, you’re bored, you’re in a
hurry, you’re scribbling like crazy. You’re bound to make mistakes. I don’t
believe any scholar in the western world has impeccable footnotes. Archival
research is a special case of the general messiness of life. 
—Lawrence Stone1
I
s error fraud? So much of this debate over Arming America comes down to
the notion that if an error can be found in my calculations or quotations
then there is solid evidence of fraud. Is that the case? Every statistician knows that there is a
“margin of error” built into all calculations. Even the Census Bureau has operated with such
an admission of probable error. If the 1990 census reports that there were 7,322,564 people in
New York City, does that mean that this is the exact population of New York at some point in
the year 1990? If it is found that the correct figure is 7,322,546, does that indicate fraud? Per-
sonally, I think not. 
Many scholars argue that all evidence, including statistical evidence, should be subject to
suspicion and scrutiny. It is often very difficult to determine what constitutes accuracy in any
subject dependent on human action. For example, several of the critics of Arming America
have referred to the “meticulous” index of the Early Records of the Town of Providence and my
failure to use it properly (though it’s unclear what constitutes proper use in the critic’s eyes). I
doubt that any historian would judge any index as meticulous, but this one contains a number
of spelling errors, omissions of names and documents, and often unusual and inconsistent
subject headings. If a document with so many errors is adjudged “meticulous,” then is not a
work of history with even fewer errors even more meticulous? At the very least, if we are to
persist in this kind of a conversation about scholarship, we should agree upon what is an
allowable margin of error and what is the line between meticulous and fraudulent. There are
errors in Arming America. These mistakes have been corrected in the revised edition. It is my
firm belief that authors should be given the opportunity to correct their errors.
1The Militia Act of 1792
There is an error in the first hardback edition of Arming America concerning the Militia
Act of 1792. On page 230the following paragraph appears:
Chapter ThreeThe problems inherent in any effort to arm the militia or even the U.S. Army were
amply demonstrated in 1792. Congress, trying to keep the militia alive and to meet its
constitutional mandate to regulate the militia, passed “An Act More effectually to pro-
vide for the National Defence.” This Act declared that “every free able bodied white
male citizen of the respective States” between the ages of eighteen and forty-five should
be enrolled in the militia and must appear “when called out to exercise.” Further, “every
citizen so enrolled, shall . . . be constantly provided with a good musket or firelock, a
sufficient bayonet and belt, two spare flints,” and other accouterments. Congress took
upon itself the responsibility of providing those guns, and specified that within five years
all muskets “shall be of bores sufficient for balls of the eighteenth part of a pound.” All
arms and ammunition intended for militia use remained exempt from attachment in
any civil suit. To keep track of its arms, each company was to make regular returns of
arms and ammunition to each state’s adjutant general, who in turn reported directly to
the president. To begin this process, Congress ordered the purchase of seven thousand
muskets. Over the next two years the government was able to purchase only 480“rifle
guns.”
The 1792 Militia Act actually reads: “That every citizen so enrolled and notified, shall
within six months thereafter, provide himself with a good musket or firelock, a sufficient bay-
onet and belt, two spare flints, and a knapsack. . . .”2
The original quotation is in fact correct, but it is not from the 1792 Militia Act, but from
the revised 1803 Militia Act, which would be the operative legislation for the militia until the
Dick Act in 1906. The accompanying footnote (p. 521n85) cites Militia Laws: Comprising the
Acts of Congress, with the Rules and Articles of War (Frankfort, KY, 1815), 8–13.3 In editing my
1200-page manuscript to a more manageable length, I compressed two paragraphs into one,
failing to keep the transition between Congress’ initial wording and its amendment of that
wording eleven years later. When Ian Binnington of the University of Illinois pointed out this
mistake to me, I immediately verified the error and sent a message to several historical e-mail
lists and corrected this error in the paperback, published by Vintage in September 2001. 
However, many critics did not accept the admission and correction of this error as suffi-
cient. Curiously those who charged that I was “deliberating falsifying the evidence” failed to
observe that on the next page I quote Secretary of War Henry Knox as stating that under the
1792 Militia Act the “militia are requested to arm and equip themselves.” Nor do they men-
tion that on page 262 I write, “In theory every member of the militia supplied his own gun, as
the Militia Act of 1792 required.” It is also worth noting that the error weakened my point in
that I aim to describe in this chapter how those in positions of authority learned from experi-
ence that the militia could not supply their own guns. The passage of the 1803 act indicates
that Congress had come to appreciate that they could not expect the militia to show up with
guns. 
It is important to recall that debates over the organization of the militia began in 1790
and occupied Congress through the next thirty years. To fully understand not just this act but
the issues that concerned the political leadership of the new republic, one must read all of
these debates. Obviously historians often summarize a large body of information, as I
attempted to do in chapter 7of Arming America. My notes direct the interested reader to many
14 Michael Bellesilesother interpretations of these controversies, though my favorite is Richard Kohn’s Eagle and
Sword.4
As Ian Binnington has helpfully observed in a widely posted email, there is even more to
this story of the Congressional discovery that individuals were not in a position to arm them-
selves that I left out of Arming America. 
The Debates and Proceedings in Congress (3rd Congress) has a letter to the House from
Secretary of War Henry Knox (dated Dec 10, 1794) in reference to “An Act More effec-
tually to provide for the National Defence” (1792) that states: “The militia are requested
to arm and equip themselves at their own expense, but there is no penalty to enforce the
injunction of the law” (p. 1397). His point seems to be that whatever the penalties
enacted to induce militiamen to arm themselves there was an insufficient supply of arms
in the United States. He notes that less than 1 in 4 of the prospective militiamen was
properly armed, and that to solve the problem the US should establish “manufactories in
each state” (p. 1399).
Presumably in response to Knox’s concerns, U.S. Statutes I: 576 records “An
Act providing Arms for the Militia throughout the United States,” July 6, 1798, that
says: “That there shall be provided, at the charge and expense of the government of the
United States, thirty thousand stand of arms . . . for the purpose of being sold to the
governments of the respective States, or the militia thereof. . . .” Finally, the 1803 amend-
ment (“An Act in addition to an Act entitled ‘An Act More effectually to provide for the
National Defence,’” U.S. Statutes II: 207, passed March 2, 1803) states: “That every
citizen duly enrolled in the militia, shall be constantly provided with arms,
accoutrements, and ammunition. . . .”
It seems to me that this makes [Bellesiles’] point very clearly, that Congress
initially wished to pass the cost of procuring firearms onto the militiamen and very
quickly found that to be impractical, and then devoted their attentions to providing the
arms themselves.
2Charles Cotesworth Pinckney
“[Bellesiles] cannot even get the name of Charles Cotesworth Pinckney
right!”
I had left the first “n” out of Charles Pinckney’s name on page 230 of the hardcover edi-
tion. Since I spelled the name correctly everywhere else in the book including the index, most
people would just note a typo. There are similar escalations of typographical errors into fail-
ures of scholarship. For instance, several people pointed out that Fayettesville is misspelled as
Fayetteville on page 419of the hardcover edition.
3Providence Women
“[Bellesiles] says that there were no inventories for women in Providence.” 
I did not quite put it that way, but I did err in implying that these inventories were solely
for men. This paragraph reads:
Weighed in an Even Balance  15The Providence records provide an indication of the nature of gun ownership in Colo-
nial America. These 181probate inventories from 1680to 1730are for property-owning
adults, the top quarter of Providence society. Eighty-eight inventories mention some
form of gun, from pistols to “a peice of a Gun Barrill.” More than half of these guns are
either evaluated as old or given such low valuation as to indicate poor quality. More than
three-fourths of the inventories containing guns fall into the last twenty years of this
fifty year period, after the distribution of firearms by the English government to the
New England militia in Queen Anne’s War. Several inventories explicitly list “one of ye
Queens armes,” which officially belonged to the government. Fifty men owned one gun
of some kind, twenty-one owned two, twelve held three, three owned four guns, and
two owned five guns. Nearly all of those man holding multiple guns were either militia
officers or sea captains (a pair of pistols being popular with this latter group). If one
could imagine these men as a militia company, half would be unarmed and a third
armed with guns that were broken or too old for service. And yet they would have been
one of the best-armed forces of their time.
The penultimate sentence implies that all 181 inventories were for men, which is not the case.
This paragraph has been rewritten as follows:
Two examples from New England evidence the nature of gun ownership in Colonial
America. Of the 181inventories from Providence, Rhode Island, for the years 1680to
1730, ninety-one mention some form of gun, from pistols to “a peice of a Gun Barrill,”
more than three-fourths of these in the last twenty years, after the distribution of
firearms by the British government to the militia in Queen Anne’s War. These guns ran
in value from two shillings to £3, 10s, with a mean evaluation of £1. Among the most
meticulous probate records from the seventeenth century are those of Essex County,
Massachusetts. Essex had 75percent more probate files, 316, in the eight years from 1673
through 1680, than did Providence in fifty years. Counting guns in these files is compli-
cated by the use of the word “arms,” which could mean anything from armor to pikes.
Including the nineteen inventories that reference “arms” without specifying type, there
are 107inventories (33.8percent) listing firearms (88or 27.8percent excluding those that
just state “arms”). By way of comparison, 79inventories (25percent) mention swords.
These guns range in value from 3s to £2, with a mean of 18s (just 2s more than the mean
evaluation of swords). At a time when the colony is paying up to £8for a new musket
and a used gun lock sells for 8s, a gun evaluated at less than 10s, as are a quarter of these
guns, almost certainly borders on useless. What use was a gun given the same value as a
chamber pot (generally rated at between 2s and 12s)? If one could imagine these men of
Essex as a militia company, two-thirds would be unarmed, while at least a quarter of
those with guns would be carrying weapons unfit for service. This portrait would match
most descriptions of the Colonial militia.
4Table Two
A very gracious critic kindly pointed out a pair of errors in table 2 of Arming America.
When computing the category of “Other” for the 1810 firearms returns (the second column
on table 2), I twice included figures from the “Espontoons” (pikes) column, raising the total of
“other” firearms to 49,105, whereas the correct amount was 48,258. A more significant error
occurs with the 1820 and 1830 returns (the third and fourth columns of table 2), where I com-
16 Michael Bellesilespletely missed a column containing “Horsemen’s pistols.” The correct number for the “Oth-
ers” entry should therefore be 20,204 and 24,986, respectively. These corrections have been
made to table 2. 
Let me take this opportunity to repeat what is often stated in Arming America, that these,
like all other sources, are suspect and subject to all sorts of qualifications. No statistics from
the nineteenth century (as perhaps from the twenty-first) are definitive. Nonetheless, I stand
by my calculations, as corrected. Different calculations of these figures can be found on the
web, with widely different totals. My addition has been checked numerous times and can be
verified by any reader by examining my cited sources: American State Papers: Documents, Leg-
islative and Executive, of the Congress of the United States, Class V: Military Affairs, 7 vols.
(Washington, D.C., 1832-61) 1: 162, 169–72, 258–62; 2: 319–23, 361–64; 4: 683–91. Fortunately,
this task is made much easier as these volumes are now online at the Library of Congress web-
site, http://memory.loc.gov. Table 2is reproduced below to facilitate the comparison.
1803 1810 1820 1830
militia 
members 524,086 677,681 837,498 1,128,594
muskets 183,070 203,517 315,459 251,019
rifles 39,648 55,811 84,816 108,036
other 13,113 48,258 20,204 24,986
total arms 235,831 307,586 400,275 384,041
5Minor Errors
Additional errors I have found, posted, and corrected in the revised edition of Arming
America:
“Colonial Benjamin Church” should, of course, read “Colonel Benjamin
Church” (p. 43);
“Despite their increased use of flintlocks in the late eighteenth century. . . .”
should be “the late seventeenth century” (p .117);
“The only incidence of gunfire in long decade leading up to rebellion came in
Boston in 1770,” is inaccurate and vague. It has been replaced with “The
most serious of the few incidences of gunfire in the decade leading up to
rebellion came in Boston in 1770” (p. 177);
“In European armies, ten flints per soldier was a normal supply; prior to 1782,
a Continental regiment usually did not have one flint per man; by the
end of the war, most had three flints per soldier, enough for one hun-
dred shots under perfect conditions.” My figure of just over thirty shots
per flint was based on modern flints. Eighteenth century military man-
uals indicate that twenty shots was the norm. The “one hundred” has
therefore been changed to read “sixty” (p. 199);
“continued the legal British tradition of controlling . . .” should read “contin-
ued the British legal tradition of controlling . . .” (p. 214);
The word “to” in Claiborne’s letter should read “be” (p. 250);
“Another time they used an ax to cut down the tree when the beer would not
come down on his own.” Well, maybe there was beer in the tree as well,
but I meant bear (p. 314);
Weighed in an Even Balance  17“Philadelphia’s fall election riot that year was the deadliest prior to the 
1850s . . .” should read “prior to the 1840s” (p. 358);
“Farrand, ed., Records of the Federal Convention 2:  207–09,” should read 
“3: 207–09” (p. 516n19);
I misspelled “Mt. Rainier.” (p. 584).
My apologies for these errors. I trust that none can be construed as deliberate or part of an
effort to misrepresent the past.
18 Michael BellesilesSpecific Challenges: 
Perceived Errors
This method [of distorting the work of others] has been used in all times and
places. Men have always tried, and still try, to ridicule the doctrine and the
person of their adversaries: to achieve this they invent thousands of stories.
—Pierre Bayle, 16971
1Benedict Arnold 
“Bellesiles makes up a story in which Benedict Arnold discovered upon hear-
ing the news of Lexington and Concord that his men were unarmed.” 
That is not quite what I said and I do not feel that I made up the story. On page 181 of
Arming America the following paragraph appears:
When news of Lexington reached New Haven, Benedict Arnold inspected his troops
and found them largely unarmed. He threatened to break into the town arsenal in order
to arm his men, but the town’s selectmen relented and opened the doors to his militia,
with Arnold supervising the distribution of Brown Besses. Of Connecticut’s twenty-six
thousand militia, four thousand (15percent) responded to the Lexington alarm. Most
observers considered this an impressive display of enthusiasm. Half these men served
less than a week.
The endnote (p. 505n32) cites the following texts:
Harold E. Selesky, War and Society in Colonial Connecticut (New Haven, CT,
1990), 228–29;
J. Hammond Trumbull, et al., eds., The Public Records of the Colony of 
Connecticut, 15vols. (Hartford, CT, 1850–90) 14: 499;
Collections of the Connecticut Historical Society,  31 vols. (Hartford, CT,
1860–1967), 20: 220-21;
Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society,  88 vols. (Boston, MA,
1794–1992), 5th ser., 9: 493.
Perhaps I have gotten some detail of the events wrong, or worded it in a displeasing fash-
ion, but if I made up this story it is difficult to understand why it appears in all previous
Arnold biographies, including those written before I was born.2Every life of Arnold contains
this encounter in greater and lesser detail. I have quoted below only from the most recent and,
Chapter Fourin my opinion, definitive biography of Arnold by James Kirby Martin. I also offer his foot-
notes to these four paragraphs.3
Early the next morning, Arnold and the Footguards mustered on the New Haven
Green. Hundreds of cheering folk turned out as well. One and all bowed their heads
when the Reverend Jonathan Edwards Jr. prayed for God’s special blessings in guiding
and protecting these citizen-soldiers as they embarked on the great crusade to preserve
human liberty. Then the assemblage applauded as Captain Arnold, impeccably attired
in a bright new blue uniform, reviewed his troops. The Footguards were no ragtag
throng; they, too, wore handsome new uniforms. Unfortunately, many lacked weapons,
powder, and musket balls, which deprecated their martial bearing. (19)
New Haven’s old-guard leaders had called an emergency town meeting the
previous day and secured a vote not to offer military succor to Massachusetts until the
reasons of the fighting at Lexington and Concord became clearer. If Arnold wanted his
troops to have the accoutrements of war, he would have to challenge the authority of the
town fathers and gain access to the local powder magazine. Once he finished reviewing
the Footguards, he barked out orders for his column to march to a nearby tavern where
New Haven’s selectmen and the local committee of safety were then meeting. All true
local patriots were welcome to follow along, thereby adding the weight of their numbers
to the looming confrontation. 
Details vary regarding what happened next. Arnold apparently aligned the
Footguards in front of the tavern before sending one of his lieutenants inside to parley.
In turn, the local leaders asked David Wooster to go outside and explain to Arnold, his
fellow Mason, that the Footguards were not to have access to the magazine; nor did they
have authorization to traipse off to Massachusetts. A bemused Arnold reputedly
retorted, “None but Almighty God shall prevent my marching.” He then gave the
selectmen five minutes to produce the keys, or he would order the Footguards to force
their way into the magazine and appropriate whatever weaponry and supplies they
needed. (20)
In the face of such a well-orchestrated form of patriotic extortion, the town
leaders relented. Once equipped with quantities of arms and ammunition, the Foot-
guards formed ranks again; and with their civilian well-wishers shouting a flurry of
huzzahs, they were soon on their way to Cambridge, Massachusetts. . . . (21)
Martin’s footnotes to these paragraphs:
19. Despite modern-day stereotypes, colonists, especially in the older seaboard settle-
ments, rarely had muskets hanging over their fireplaces. Most were unprepared to
defend hearth and home. Hence, small arms and powder and ball were in very short
supply at the outset of the war, at least until France started to provide covert aid after
mid-1776. Although BA’s soldiers promised to furnish their own weapons, the only
readily available supply of arms was stored at New Haven’s central powder magazine,
where militiamen went to receive weaponry in case of some military emergency. Thus
BA and his Footguards had to gain access to the storehouse if they wanted an amply [sic]
supply of arms.
20. Atwater, History of New Haven, 42, credits BA with these words but offers
no source. BA’s words may have been apocryphal, but his forceful confrontation with
New Haven’s old guard leaders was not.
20 Michael Bellesiles21. Buel,Dear Liberty, 36-38, states that 3,716Connecticut volunteers marched
for Cambridge, Mass., within a week of hearing about Lexington and Concord. Some 46
of 72Connecticut towns sent troops to Massachusetts in the first days of the contest.
Gipson, Jared Ingersoll, 338n., estimated that about one thousand New Havenites took
up arms on behalf of the rebel cause at some point during the war. 
Even critics who have access to this information repeat the accusation of falsification.
Thus, I have been charged with lumping “together guns and ammunition in his discussion of
Benedict Arnold’s march on the powderhouse in 1776.” The Province of Connecticut stored
arms remaining in their charge at the end of the Seven Years’ War in the armory. Oddly, the
very charge that this alleged error indicates fraud is marked by error, as the American Revo-
lution started in 1775, not 1776. In the absence of any contrary evidence indicating the inaccu-
racy of the standard reading of these events, I have retained the original wording of this
passage in Arming America. 
2ZOG
“[Bellesiles] is a paid agent of ZOG.” 
It is instructive to discover that one is a paid agent of something one has never heard of.
ZOG is the “Zionist Occupational [sic] Government.” I am not now, nor have I ever been, to
my knowledge, an agent of ZOG. 
3Funding
“Bellesiles is funded by anti-gun groups.” 
I am not now, nor have I ever been funded by an “anti-gun” group. The research for
Arming America was supported by the American Antiquarian Society, the Huntington
Library, the American Philosophical Association, the Stanford Humanities Center, and
Emory University. I do not believe that any of these constitutes an “anti-gun group.”
4Gun-Hating
“A Gun-Hating Historian.” 
The headline above has appeared in several journals and on several web sites. This is an
odd description that I do not understand and is made without the slightest hint of evidence. If
anything, I would think that anyone who reads Arming Americacould not help but notice that
I am fascinated with firearms. 
5Political Agenda
“Masquerading as an historical investigation, this book is really about pro-
moting statist public policies that reveal the class hatred felt by many intellec-
tuals for a broad section of the American people.” 
Weighed in an Even Balance  21Many commentaries of the book accuse me of a left-wing political agenda; or, as one
email message began, “You are a tool of the liberals (or state socialists, as they really are) seek-
ing to steal my guns.” Arming America does not offer any policy recommendations, nor does it
promote any political agenda, which in the eyes of some is also a flaw. To my knowledge, I
have only twice written on current gun control issues, both times to note the danger of further
gun regulation because of historic patterns of selective enforcement. 
6George Washington on the Militia
“Bellesiles has misquoted Washington. Bellesiles leads the reader to believe
that Washington was complaining that this was the general state of the
militia.”
On page 159 of Arming America I quote George Washington’s letter to Governor Din-
widdie as follows: 
Colonel Washington reported on the militia to Governor Dinwiddie: “Many of them
[are] unarmed, and all without ammunition or provision.” In one company of more than
seventy men, he reported, only twenty-five had any sort of firearms. Washington found
such militia “incapacitated to defend themselves, much less to annoy the enemy.” 
The source provided in footnote 63 on page 500 is John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., Writings of Wash-
ington, 2: 78–79, and reads as follows:
I think myself under the necessity of informing your Honor, of the odd behaviour of the
few Militia that were marched hither from Fairfax, Culpeper, and Prince William coun-
ties. Many of them unarmed, and all without ammunition or provision. Those of
Culpeper heaved particularly ill: Out of the hundred that were draughted, seventy-odd
arrived here; of which only twenty-five were tolerably armed.
I proposed to the unarm’d, that as they came from home (at least with a shew)
of serving their country; and as they were, from the want of arms, incapacitated to
defend themselves, much less to annoy the enemy, or afford any protection to the inhabi-
tants; they they shou’d (during their short stay here) assist in forwarding the public
works; for which I offered them 6d. per day extraordinary. But they were deaf to this
and every other proposition which had any tendency to the interest of the Service.4
It is unclear to me how I have misconstrued Washington’s meaning, though an alterna-
tive reading may be available. Had Washington never said another negative word about the
militia, then lifting this single passage would have been unfair. However, this quotation is not
the sole instance of Washington’s negative judgment of the militia. Many other statements by
Washington critical of the militia appear in Arming America, with more cited in various foot-
notes,5 and many more could have been added.6 For instance, Arming America contains a
lengthy extract from Washington’s 1780“circular to the states,” in which he bluntly dismissed
the militia ideal as “chimerical.”7That this judgment was not simply rhetoric being employed
for a temporary political purpose should be evident from Washington’s actions as president, in
which he consistently worked to build a professional army and a select militia. All of this
22 Michael Bellesilesinformation appears in Arming America with supportive citations and references to the work
of other historians.
7Tocqueville
(A) “Bellesiles completely ignores Tocqueville, who said, ‘There is not a
farmer but passes some of his time hunting and owns a good gun.’”
(B) “Bellesiles omits dozens of other travellers who write of widespread own-
ership of firearms, among them Alexis de Tocqueville. The famed French
observer describes a typical ‘peasant’s cabin’ in Kentucky or Tennessee as con-
taining ‘a fairly clean bed, some chairs, a good gun.’”
It is true that Arming America does not contain either of these quotations. Tocqueville
does not discuss the centrality of either guns or violence in America anywhere in the two vol-
umes of Democracy in America. But then neither of these two quotations is from that book;
they are taken instead from Tocqueville’s notebook.8 The first quote (A), dated December 15,
1831, is not Tocqueville speaking, but a farmer with whom Tocqueville is talking. It is also
notable that the exact context of the farmer’s statement is a discussion of slavery: “There is no
small-holder in Tennessee so poor,” this farmer told Tocqueville, “but he has one black or
two.” This assertion, a form of the popular pro-slavery argument that slave-ownership was
widespread among whites and offered poor whites a path to upward mobility, should lead one
to question the credibility of the other generalizations made by this farmer. The second quota-
tion (B) is from the same time but in a different notebook, into which Tocqueville transcribed
summaries of notes from his conversations. Oddly, quote (B) left off the next clause in the
original: “often some books and almost always a newspaper.” It is also notable that Toc-
queville is referring to a specific “peasant’s cabin,” which he draws in the margin of his note-
book. That this passage (B) is based on his conversation with the farmer quoted first (A) is
evident by the succeeding observation in (B), “Almost all the farmers we saw, even the poor-
est, had some slaves.”9
Tocqueville himself did not share the view of this quoted farmer. His notebooks do con-
tain references to guns, and even to good shots, but the latter tend to be Indians, as is the case
during his trip to Saginaw. He is delighted to be at the edge of Western civilization and as an
avid hunter is very impressed with the skill of a group of frontiersmen, who seem to know
their weapons fairly well, though their guns are generally of an inferior quality. But these
stereotypical frontiersmen are Quebecois voyagers. In contrast, Tocqueville expresses a degree
of contempt for the Americans, who he describes as entirely concerned with cutting down
trees, clearing the land, and planting crops, deficient in either romance or heroism.10 The
Americans, Tocqueville thought, lacked a military spirit, which was not necessarily a bad
thing. After viewing the Albany militia in July 1831, he wrote, “It’s the national guard of the
country, but of a country where the military spirit is absolutely unknown. You may judge
what kind of pigeons these honest citizens made; their martial appearance was really comic to
see.”11
Weighed in an Even Balance  23More important is the degree to which Tocqueville’s brief conversation with a Tennessee
farmer may have determined his mature judgment. No such commentary appears in Toc-
queville’s published work. On page 348 of Arming America I do quote the one passage from
Democracy in America I know of that addresses firearms. In discussing the danger of “demo-
cratic armies,” Tocqueville writes that “Democratic nations are naturally prone to peace from
their interests and their propensities, they are constantly drawn to war and revolutions by
their armies.”12
Can anyone who reads Democracy in America really believe that its author perceived the
United States as a heavily armed and violent society? Anyone who takes the time to read all of
Tocqueville’s writings on his travels in North America will come away with a very different
perspective. Mobility, hard work, individualism, and equality mixed with conformity and
greed, these are the prime characteristics of the people he observes in the early 1830s. And, as
Arming America argues, the same can be found in most, though certainly not all, travel
accounts from the years prior to the Civil War. 
There is one further aspect to this criticism that I did not quote this precise line in Toc-
queville’s notebooks. There are no doubt thousands of possible quotations that I did not use.
Historians have no choice but to be selective. History is not a chronicle of everything that hap-
pened; it is not a textual version of Italo Calvino’s land of master geographers who create a
map with a one-to-one ratio that is then laid atop their country, smothering everything.13
Such an approach to history would smother the past as well, making it dull and unreadable.
The historian must choose what he or she believes to be most significant and construct a
meaningful narrative from that material.
8John Lawson
“He gets Lawson completely wrong. Lawson sees guns everywhere.”
Another web-based criticism states that I failed to quote Lawson, who held
that everyone “shared in the misfortunes, and rejoiced at the advance and
Rifle of their brethren.”
The latter statement is correct, in that I did not quote that sentence, which actually reads:
“shared in the misfortunes, and rejoiced at the advance and Rise of their brethren.”14One can
see how someone would misread this old fashioned s as an f and then imagine the l.
The text in question is John Lawson’s 1709book, A New Voyage to Carolina. I quote Law-
son four times, each time correctly and, I trust, true to the context. But the reader should make
an independent judgment, as all historical documents are open to interpretation. The passages
from Arming Americaare below, followed by the original passages cited in the footnotes (keep-
ing in mind that sometimes slooks like fin this edition).
Arming America:
When John Lawson came to the Carolinas in 1701to explore and hunt, one of his first
observations was that “the meanest Planter” in America could enjoy hunting. Even “A
poor Labourer, that is Master of his Gun” might hunt under the law. Yet Lawson also
noticed that these settlers all worked hard on their land and devoted little or no time to
hunting, leaving that pleasure to the Indians. When Lawson went exploring with two
24 Michael Bellesilessettlers, he discovered that his was the only gun: “We had but one Gun amongst us
[with] one Load of Ammunition.” “Relying wholly on Providence,” the three men, like
so many others in early America, traveled among and with many different Indians for
the next few weeks without mishap. Lawson concluded that journey by noting that the
local Indians were mostly friendly and “hunt and fowl for us at seasonable rates.” He
thought no place “so free from Blood-shed, as Carolina,” though he warned his readers
that they would have to bring their own arms and ammunition with them to America.
(p. 104)
A New Voyage to Carolina:
A Quest after Game, being as freely and peremptorily enjoy’d by the meanest Planter, as
he that is the highest in Dignity, or wealthiest in the Province. Deer, and other Game
that are naturally wild, being not immur’d or preserv’d within Boundaries, to satisfy the
Appetite of the Rich alone. A poor Labourer, that is Master of his Gun, &c. hath as good
a Claim to have continu’d Coarses of Delicacies crouded upon his Table, as he that is
Mastter of a greater Purse. 
My self and two more were left behind, by Reason the Canoe would not carry
us all; we had but one Gun amongst us, one Load of Ammunition, and no Provision.
Had our Men in the Canoe miscarry’d, we must (in all Probability) there have perish’d.
Relying wholly on Providence, we march’d on, now and then paying our
Respects to the new-married Man. 
And as for what may be hop’d for, towards a happy Life and Being, by such as
design to remove thither, I shall add this; That with prudent Management, I can affirm
by Experience, not by Hear-say, That any Person, with a small Beginning, may live very
comfortably, and not only provide for the Necessaries of Life, but likewise for those that
are to success him; Provisions being very plentiful, and of good Variety, to accommodate
genteel House-keeping; and the neighbouring Indians are friendly, and in many Cases
serviceable to us, in making us Wares to catch Fish in, for a small matter, which proves
of great Advantage to large Families, because these Engines take great Quantities of
many Sorts of Fish, that are very good and nourishing: Some of them hunt and fowl for
us at reasonable Rates, the Country being as plentifully provided with all Sorts of Game,
as any Part of America; the poorest Sort of Planters often get them to plant for them, by
hiring them for that Season, or for so much Work, which commonly comes very reason-
able. Moreover, it is remarkable, That no Place on the Continent ofAmerica, has seated
an English Colony so free from Blood-shed, as Carolina; but all the others have been more
damag’d and disturb’d by the Indians, than they have; which is worthy Notice, when we
consider how oddly it was first planted with Inhabitants.
As for the Commodities, which are necessary to carry over to this Plantation,
for Use and Merchandize, and are, therefore, requisite for those to have along with
them, that intend to transport themselves thither; they are Guns, Powder and Shot,
Flints, Linnens of all sorts, but chiefly ordinary Blues. . . . (p. 12–13, 15, 42, 86, 88, 
repectively, original emphases).
Arming America:
So common had guns become among the Indians in the Carolinas by the early eigh-
teenth century that John Lawson found it notable that the Wateree were “very poor in
English Effects,” having few guns and still relying mostly on bows. Lawson thought an
Weighed in an Even Balance  25Indian who used a gun regularly could not miss more than one shot in twenty. Yet on
one hunting trip Lawson and his Indian companions sighted “plenty of turkies, but
perch’d upon such lofty Oaks, that our Guns would not kill them, tho’ we shot very
often, and our Guns were very good.” A few days later a wolf came right into their
camp. “One of our Company fir’d a Gun at the Beast; but, I believe, there was a Mistake
in the loading of it, for it did him no Harm. The Wolf stay’d till he had almost loaded
again,” when Lawson’s spaniel chased the animal off. (p. 126–27)
A New Voyage to Carolina:
Our Indian having this Day kill’d good Store of Provision with his Gun, he always shot
with a single Ball, missing but two Shoots in above forty. . . .
This Nation is much more populous than the Congrees, and their Neighbours,
yet understand not one anothers Speech, They are very poor in EnglishEffects, several of
them having no Guns, making Use of Bows and Arrows, being a lazy idle People, a
Quality incident to most Indians, but none to that Degree as these, as I ever met withal. 
At Night, we lay by a swift Current, where we saw plenty of Turkies, but
perch’d upon such lofty Oaks, that our Guns would not kill them, tho’ we shot very
often, and our Guns were very good. Some of our Company shot several times, at one
Turkey, before he would fly away, the Pieces being loaded with large Goose-shot.
After we had supp’d, and all lay down to sleep, there came a Wolf close to the
Fire-side, where we lay. My Spaniel soon discover’d him, at which, one of our Company
fir’d a Gun at the Beast; but, I believe, there was a Mistake in the loading of it, for it did
him no Harm. The Wolf stay’d till he had almost loaded again, but the Bitch making a
great Noise, at last left us and went aside. We had no sooner laid down, but he
approach’d us again, yet was more shy, so that we could not get a Shot at him. (27, 32, 45,
50, respectively, original emphases)
Arming America:
One of the signs “that the Quera, or good Spirit, has been very kind to the English Men,”
some Indians told John Lawson, is that Quera taught “them to make Guns, and Ammu-
nition, besides a great many other Necessaries, that are helpful to Man, all which, they
say, will be deliver’d to them, when that good Spirit sees fit.” (p. 136)
A New Voyage to Carolina:
They all believe, that this World is round, and that there are two Spirits, the one good,
the other bad; The good one they reckon to be the Author and Maker of all every thing,
and say, that it is he, that gives them the Fruits of the Earth, and has taught them to
hunt, fish, and be wise enough to overpower the Beasts of the Wilderness, and all other
Creatures, that they may be assistant, and beneficial to Man; to which they add, that the
Quera, or good Spirit, has been very kind to the English Men, to teach them to make
Guns, and Ammunition, besides a great many other Necessaries, that are helpful to
Man, all which, they say, will be deliver’d to them, when that good Spirit sees fit. (p. 211,
original empases)
26 Michael BellesilesArming America:
John Lawson noted this method of repair in 1701in South Carolina. He wrote that
Indians would shoot “about 100Loads of Ammunition, before they bring the Gun to
shoot according to their Mind.” This seems unlikely, as one hundred loads with bullets
would not only take the whole day, requiring constant cleaning, and dangerously over-
heat the gun often, but would also be extremely expensive. Lawson noted that they
stocked guns well, though their only tools were knives, a point made also by James
Adair, a merchant with the Chickasaw. (p. 492n67)
A New Voyage to Carolina:
they being curious Artists in managing a Gun, to make it carry either Ball, or Shot, true.
When they have bought a Piece, and find it to shoot any Ways crooked, they take the
Barrel out of the Stock, cutting a Notch in a Tree, wherein they set it streight, sometimes
shooting away above 100Loads of Ammunition, before they bring the Gun to shoot
according to their Mind. (27, 172, respectively)
9Gun-Free America
Arming America argues that antebellum America was “a basically gun-free
society.”
This statement is not correct. As the original introduction states, “This book does not
argue that guns did not exist in early America, nor that violence did not occur.” Arming Amer-
ica is an exploration of the question “of cultural primacy: What lies at the core of national
identity?” Its conclusion is that while in “the modern United States, guns are determinative;
for early America, they served an often limited function.”15 Anyone who reads just the chap-
ter titles should conclude that the book does not argue that America was “basically gun-free.”
Nonetheless, this assertion is one of the most widely made misunderstandings of Arming
America, made repeatedly in reviews (often by the same authors publishing multiple reviews).
Similarly, one critic says in two of his reviews of Arming America that the book argues that
“our forebearers” “didn’t own guns, didn’t know how to use them and didn’t hunt.” No such
statement appears in Arming America. 
Another common misreading of the book is that it argues that “America’s gun culture is
a recent development.” In fact, Arming America puts forth the thesis that guns became more
central to American culture in the years 1840to 1870, which is not terribly recent.
10Pistoles
“He covered up evidence of hundreds of pistoles in the Virginia colonial
records.” 
A pistolewas a Spanish coin.
Weighed in an Even Balance  2711Maryland Inventory of Arms
“The Maryland inventory of arms taken in 1768 on p 180 is completely
wrong. Belleiles [sic] says that there are only 200 muskets (note the suspi-
ciously round number) when there are actually 889.”
The inventory of arms lists the following:16
200muskets;
86carbines;
35pistols in usable condition;
442muskets “very rusty” with broken or no locks;
104carbines “mostly without locks, and not worth repairing”;
57“old muskets, and carbines”;
9pistols with broken locks;
212swords;
50sword blades;
47pikes.
In Arming America I compressed the swords and sword blades into 262 swords and did not
include the pikes. The critic quoted above added all the muskets and carbines regardless of
condition for his total while taking only the first number from my list. It is worth noting that
when a critic of Arming America made this charge in the draft of his article, the journal’s fact-
checker came up with a third total. When I asked her to check again, her total was the same as
mine and the original accusation was dropped. It is not always as easy to reach calculations
from old texts as modern readers may believe. In this case, my calculations were correct, those
of the critic incorrect. But I hold that a miscalculation is not an indication of the intent to mis-
lead. 
12Harold Selesky
“[He] misquotes and misinterprets Harold Selesky’s book on the Connecticut
militia.”
This charge is quite common, though it is made without reference to a page number in
either of our books. I am a great fan of Selesky’s War and Society,17thinking it one of the finest
works of eighteenth-century military history, and quote from it in Arming America on eight
occasions. I have reproduced each of those instances below followed by the original in
Selesky’s book. As I trust is evident, all the quotations are exactly correct. However I did dis-
cover one error in the footnotes; the citation for the first quotation on page 168 appears in the
footnote to the following paragraph, which quotes from the same pages. 
Arming America:
Despite living “in a wilderness radically different from their homeland,” as military
historian Harold Selesky has written, “the colonists clung to the military training which
reminded them they were Englishmen.” Thus they tended to practice formal field
movements and the “pushing of pikes,” when they practiced at all. For “militiamen
were inept,” prone to hurt one another in their practices and not cultivating “the marks-
28 Michael Bellesilesmanship and woodscraft which would have made them a match” for their Indian oppo-
nents. (p. 115–16)
War and Society:
June 1663, the New Haven Company divided in half to practice forcing back a tightly
packed opponent by “pushing of pikes.” Moreover, the militiamen were inept: one man
inadvertently “cast his pike . . . into the other part” of the company and “struck one on
the face that had it been an armed pike [steel-tipped] it might have been hazardous to
the man’s life.” Despite having lived for thirty years in a wilderness radically different
from their homeland, the colonists clung to the military training which reminded them
they were Englishmen. Although the Law Code of 1650required each town to provide
enough gunpowder for target practice on training days, the colonists did not cultivate
the marksmanship and woodscraft which would have made them a match for the Dutch
and the Indians. (p. 14)
Arming America:
As the military historian Harold Selesky wrote, the settlers “had neither the training nor
the skill to meet the Indians as military equals.” (p. 133)
War and Society:
While geographical isolation made local control of military affairs a necessity, the set-
tlers did not organize their colony along military lines. A handful were professional
soldiers, and a few more may have learned to use firearms at the annual militia muster
in England, but they had neither the training nor the skill to meet the Indians as military
equals. (p. 3)
Arming America:
Thus the Pequot War, won by Mason’s ruthless destruction of Mystic Village and aided
by Indian allies who guided him through Pequot territory, lulled the New Englanders
into thinking that they could easily meet any future Indian threat. While the whites
slept, the Indians “mated firearms with their superior knowledge of the land to create a
new style of hit-and-run fighting that emphasized speed, stealth, and surprise.” (p. 134)
War and Society:
The Pequot war shaped New England’s attitudes about military force for decades to
come. By winning so decisively and so quickly, the settlers lost the incentive to learn the
military skills needed to defeat future Indian threats. The obliteration of the Pequots
removed any pressing need to think about how to fight a mobile enemy, and left Con-
necticut dependent on its Indian allies. Mason had exploited an extraordinary situation
without solving the tactical problems that had baffled Massachusetts. Over the next forty
years the Indians gradually mated firearms with their superior knowledge of the land to
create a new style of hit-and-run fighting that emphasized speed, stealth, and surprise.
When some tribes rose up against English domination in 1675, the settlers found they
still could not match the military skills of the Indians. (p. 10)
Weighed in an Even Balance  29Arming America:
By 1711Connecticut had essentially abandoned its militia system for a “military system
[that] began to look more like Britain’s, which had long since learned to use bounty
money to induce poor men to perform dangerous military service.” Military service
simply did not appeal to the vast majority of Americans. By 1740every Connecticut
recruit received wages, food, clothing, and a gun, as well as a share of any booty, as the
colony was “openly and happily paying poor men to go to war.” (p. 140)
War and Society:
Still, the militia ideal of universal service was no longer the central paradigm in the way
the colony organized its resources for war. Connecticut’s military system began to look
more like Britain’s, which had long since learned to use bounty money to induce poor
men to perform dangerous military service, than like that of a frontier colony in which
leaders could compel men to join together in common self-defense. In the next twenty-
five years, the idea of basing military service on economic self-interest became the domi-
nant theme in the way Connecticut organized its resources for imperial war.
. . . What contemporaries overlooked was the extent to which the Assembly
shifted from using financial incentives as a way of ameliorating compulsory service, as it
had done in 1709–11, to openly and happily paying poor men to go to war. 
(p. 66, 82, respectively)
Arming America:
As Harold Selesky has summarized, “The soldiers lost heavily in a morning ambush,
demonstrating once again their lack of skill at Indian-style war, but in the afternoon
they repulsed every French attack from behind the breastwork around their main
camp.” (p. 157)
War and Society:
Connecticut did not produce good soldiers. They were brave, and within the limits of
their training, effective if too much was not expected of them on the few occasions when
they actually went into battle. But they were not adept at war in the wilderness because
the colony did not have an active frontier to nurture the skills needed for scouting and
skirmishing. The most important colonial victory of the war, the defeat of the French at
Lake George on 8September 1755, showed the strengths and weaknesses of a New
England army. The soldiers lost heavily in a morning ambush, demonstrating once
again their lack of skill at Indian-style war, but in the afternoon they repulsed every
French attack from behind the breastwork around their main camp. (p. 185)
Arming America:
As Harold Selesky has written, “the leaders rejected any attempt to use the militia ideal
of universal service as a model for the expeditionary regiments long before they received
the imperial subsidies that allowed them to come close to creating a colonial version of a
professional army by 1762.” (p. 160)
30 Michael BellesilesWar and Society:
The Assembly’s most important decision was to apply the methods that had worked so
well in King George’s War to raise troops by financial incentive; the leaders rejected any
attempt to use the militia ideal of universal service as a model for the expeditionary
regiments long before they received the imperial subsidies that allowed them to come
close to creating a colonial version of a professional army by 1762. The regiments
became a source of employment for men who viewed military service as a way to get
ahead financially—just the sort of men the Assembly wanted to attract—and had a
continuity in personnel unlike any previous Connecticut military force. But they were
still not a standing force like the British regular army. The regiments were raised each
year for one campaign at a time—eight times in eight years—and retained many of the
characteristics of the militia, including rudimentary training, poor discipline, and offi-
cers chosen primarily for their popularity with the soldiers. (p. 144)
Arming America:
One of the most astute students of the Colonial militia, Harold Selesky, has summarized
its nature perfectly: “Many militiamen fancied themselves as soldiers because they could
play on the parade ground without the slightest danger of actually being called to fight.”
(p. 168)
War and Society:
The Stamp Act crisis saw the introduction of purposeful violence into the political
process. The inclination to use force was in part a product of an inflated military self-
esteem stemming from the war which had just ended in unprecedented victory. Many
militiamen fancied themselves as soldiers because they could play on the parade ground
without the slightest danger of actually being called to fight. (p. 224)
Arming America:
For instance, in 1762, “while the real soldiers were joining the expeditionary regiments,
militiamen in both North Haven and Stratford held a ‘mock Indian fight’ at their
annual musters in May.” It seemed irrelevant to these men that “no militiamen had been
asked to fight Indians for forty years,” and the two musters descended into tragic farce
in no time, with one soldier killed in North Haven, and another shot in the leg at Strat-
ford, thus emphasizing “the average militiaman’s lack of military skill and experience.”
(p. 168)
War and Society:
In 1762, while the real soldiers were joining the expeditionary regiments, militiamen in
both North Haven and Stratford held a “mock Indian fight” at their annual musters in
May. These exercises had an air of unreality—no militiamen had been asked to fight
Indians for forty years—but that did not stop both musters from ending in tragedy.
When a man was accidentally killed at North Haven and another was shot in the leg at
Stratford, it only emphasized the average militiaman’s lack of military skill and 
experience. (p. 224–25)
Weighed in an Even Balance  3113The NRA
“Bellesiles’ essential argument is that there were almost no guns in the U.S.
until the 1850s, partly because they were expensive, and partly because there
was a near-universal hatred of guns. A gun culture only developed because
the NRA used government subsidies to create one after the Civil War.” 
I do not believe that any part of the above summary is correct. The NRA is mentioned
only on the penultimate page of the book (p. 443) in noting that it was founded by two Union
veterans, William Church and George Wingate, who were disturbed that the vast majority of
the recruits they had trained during the Civil War had never held a gun in their lives.
14An Exact Number of Guns
“There were [x number of] guns in America.” Or, “there were enough guns
for [x percent] of the population.”18
Nowhere does Arming Americapretend to know how many guns there were at any given
time in the United States or what percentage of the population bore arms, or any other statis-
tical certainty. Rather, I provided what information I could find, offering it in hopes of
approaching some understanding of the place of firearms in early America. For instance, in
looking at the 1810militia returns I write:
In 1810Secretary of War William Eustis, in what was probably the most thorough and
exact of all the studies, found that almost nothing had changed: 46percent of the militia
bore arms; the total number of guns recorded was sufficient for 4.3percent of the Amer-
ican population, or 20.9percent of the white adult males. (p. 263)
There are those who have read that sentence and then written that I argue that just 4.3percent
of the American people owned guns. While that assertion may be true, it is not what I say nor
is there any way that we can know; in fact, in the sentence previous to the one quoted above I
refer to these returns as “certainly incomplete.” Some writers have gone further and insisted
that I contradict myself since I offer many different sources that suggest different levels of gun
ownership. As one critic wrote, “which is it, 14.7percent or 4.3percent or 7percent or what?”
There are no claims for definitiveness in this book. 
15Vermont Supreme Court
“He cites as his source the Vermont Supreme Court records, but that court
did not open until December 1778 and its minutes from September 1782 to
August 1791have been missing since the early twentieth century.” 
To be precise, I cite the Vermont Superior Court records (there is a slight difference).
There are ten volumes of its files in the Rutland County Superior Courthouse (including cases
from several years before the first sitting of the court). I worked with these volumes in the
early 1980s. Volume 1of this series vanished sometime after 1985, and was a topic of conversa-
tion at the Society of Historians of the Early American Republic (SHEAR) conference at His-
32 Michael Bellesilestoric Sturbridge in 1989. I had the good fortune to find the Windham County Court records,
thought to have disappeared in the early twentieth century, in the abandoned jail in Newfane,
Vermont. As I learned from Oscar Knowles, who had been a teenager at the time, the Civilian
Conservation Corps (CCC) had moved these documents to the jailhouse in the 1930s. These
files contained many Superior Court cases, for the Vermont court, like most others in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, worked a circuit of the state. The jailhouse also
contained the original library of the Vermont Superior Court and many other legal records.
Shortly thereafter, State Archivist Gregory Sanford and the Windham County assistant
judges raised the money to catalogue and store these records at the Newfane Historical Soci-
ety, protecting a highly significant collection of source documents.
It is also worth noting that this quoted criticism is made in objecting to footnote 145 on
page 558 as incomplete. Yet the text’s statement, that there were “five reported murders” in
Vermont prior to 1790, is not questioned. I cited only the records where these murder cases are
heard and the work of Professor Randolph Roth. I could have cited additional Vermont court
records that did not contain murder cases, but did not think that was necessary. I also could
have cited the Vermont newspapers from these years, in which I read widely. In the revised
edition of Arming America I have altered this footnote to include all the court records. 
16Travel Accounts
Many critics write that Arming America ignores travel accounts that observe
the common use of firearms. A favorite quote is from an anonymous “Diary
of a Scot,” from 1822: “Not only in general do they make the musket their
amusement throughout the states . . . [but] in every house it may be found
ready loaded for action.”
This document is quoted in Arming America. It should be noted that I hoped with this
book to get beyond the comparison of favorite quotations into a more thorough examination
of popular attitudes; to arrive, in short, at the norm rather than the purely anecdotal. A fur-
ther reading of this diary is instructive. Its anonymous author discovered no support for what
he had initially believed to be true about America. When he observed a Connecticut militia
muster, he was appalled. “Their implements of war, long brass clasped german firelocks, rusty
fowling pieces, fusees, and musketoons . . . would have equipped the much famed troops of
Falstaff. . . . They marched along, some supporting [arms] others presenting weapons on the
ground. They never designed to be all one way or going the same road. Some straggling
behind a dozen of yards apart, were locked in each others arms, and on tiptoe were acting the
fool, or dandy. Another party bustling along, were humorously kicking the breeches of those
before them with their knees. . . . The Captains raved and they laughed, and ended the whole
in good humor.”19 Each text requires a full reading, a single sentence does not stand on its
own. 
Some critiques list travel accounts examined in Arming America, stating that they all con-
tain references to high levels of gun ownership. Yet a closer examination of these texts often
shows otherwise. To take just one example, the Scots merchant John Melish came to the
United States in 1806, stayed far longer than Tocqueville, and ended up writing two massive
Weighed in an Even Balance  33volumes about his Travels in the United States. As Stephen Watts has written, Melish “mar-
veled at the dynamic, bustling republic.”20 The slave states lacked the vigor and concern for
the public good Melish found north of the Ohio, but the vices that caught Melish’s attention
were “gaming and drinking.”21 His one experience of violence in his five years in the United
States came outside Savannah at the very start of his travels, where two slaves had been exe-
cuted for killing their overseer, “one was hanged, and the other was burnt to death.” Melish
was “horror-struck” when he saw the remains of the latter slave, but continued his travels.22
South Carolina was notable for its horrid food; “unsightly coffee, brown bread, some bacon
and butter, which looked like ‘train oil thickened with salt.’ I had just put the cup to my lips,
when I heard a violent retching in the adjoining room.” He could not leave “this wretched
place” fast enough.23 The free states were more to Melish’s liking. When he visited the fron-
tier beyond the Appalachians he discovered commerce and prosperous farms. The west was
vibrant with activity and hard work. Pittsburgh, already home to schools, newspapers, and a
library, was alive with “the sound of the hammer and anvil.”24 Even the smaller western
towns resounded with commerce and labor and boasted good schools. When Melish explicitly
compared America to Europe, he found the former peaceful, “a happy retreat from the turbu-
lent scenes of Europe.”25 As with Tocqueville, those who bother to read all of Melish’s two
published volumes will come away with the sense that these travelers did not visit a society
more violent and more heavily armed than their own. No such commentary appears in these
hundreds of pages.
17Early Gun Laws
“Completely ignored are laws requiring gun ownership.” 
These laws are discussed in Arming America, as is the dissatisfaction of various govern-
ments with the result. See for instance, pages 75–80 and 229–39. It is worth noting that those
who make this charge seem to work on the assumption that a law must become reality; if the
state orders the purchase of a gun, the people respond by buying one. That may have been the
case, but evidence is required in support of this position.
18Daniel Morgan
“Bellesiles omits the crucial contribution of Daniel Morgan’s riflemen to the
Continental cause.”26
Daniel Morgan is in the index and discussed in Arming America on pages 195–203. As I
write in these pages, “Morgan’s men performed brilliantly at the two Saratoga battles and
demonstrated the value of the rifle’s greater accuracy.”27
19Revolutionary Outlaws 
“Bellesiles’ book draws conclusions ignoring or recanting much of his earlier
work, Revolutionary Outlaws. . . . This is not surprising given that he is now
director of the Center for the Study of Violence at Emory University.” 
34 Michael BellesilesSeveral people contend that Arming America completely ignores Ethan Allen and the
Green Mountain Boys while contradicting my earlier book, Revolutionary Outlaws.28 Ethan
Allen does appear in the index of Arming America and is discussed on pages 104–105 and
184–85. The exact nature of any contradiction between the two books has never been speci-
fied, nor do I have the slightest idea what my having been director of the Center for the Study
of Violence, an interdisciplinary undergraduate program, has to do with Arming America.
20Gun Knowledge
“[H]is knowledge of guns is limited (making a handgun a long gun sort of
thing).”
Though I have been brought in by museums as a consultant on early firearms, I will
acknowledge immediately that I am an historian first. It is difficult to measure levels of
expertise, but I know of no instance in which I confused a handgun and a “long gun.” Those
who know modern firearms often assume that I must be wrong based on the way things are
now. Thus many black powder enthusiasts have responded angrily that I have it all wrong
about muskets, that they are not as unreliable and inaccurate as presented in Arming America.
The present tense is vital. When I have actually spoken in person to people knowledgeable
about early firearms, they readily admit that their guns have been refitted, that they use mod-
ern powder which is far more reliable than eighteenth-century powder, that they regularly
maintain their weapons, that they practice often, and that they do not fire under battle condi-
tions. These are significant differences. 
21Thomas Jefferson
“Bellesiles ignores Thomas Jefferson, who wrote of ‘every soldier in our
Army ha[ving] been intimate with his gun from infancy.’ . . . Between Prof.
Bellesiles and Thomas Jefferson, who is a better guide to Jefferson’s contem-
poraries’ attitudes and practices about guns?”
I do not ignore Thomas Jefferson or this particular quotation. On page 182 of Arming
America, I wrote:
Thomas Jefferson voiced what later became the standard view when he ascribed the
victory [at Breed’s or Bunker Hill] “to our superiority in taking aim when we fire; every
soldier in our army having been intimate with his gun from infancy.” He proclaimed
that a “want of discipline” was irrelevant beside “native courage and a cordial tho’ gov-
ernable animation in the cause.” Those who actually knew something of warfare were
not so certain.29
My point was that those who had combat experience, which Jefferson did not, had a dif-
ferent perspective. Jefferson tended to see things through ideologically tinted glasses, the
world as it should be. Later in Arming America I examine his actions as President, when expe-
rience forced him to be a bit more practical. I found it notable that seven of his eight annual
Weighed in an Even Balance  35addresses to Congress called for a thorough reform of the militia and that he promoted the
most significant exercise of central authority to that date in attempting to arm the militia with
the 1808 Militia Act. Of course these issues are all open to interpretation and one need not
accept either me or Jefferson as the better guide to the past. 
22Peter Lydick 
“Among the incredibly inaccurate claims of this book, is his condemning the
famous gunsmith Peter Lydick.” 
This criticism contains three inaccuracies: the gunsmith’s name, his fame, and my opin-
ion of him. The correct name is Peter Lydig, who was not terribly famous, and I do not con-
demn him. Rather, I am quoting Maryland’s inspector of firearms, Reaz Beall, who wrote that
Lydig was “culpable” of fraud in offering the state such poorly made guns.
Interestingly, this criticism appears to have been based on an earlier web critique which
faulted me from getting Lydig’s name wrong: “Bellesiles on p. 186refers to the failure of guns
at proof made by Peter Lydig, Baltimore’s leading gunsmith. His source for that claim found,
not Peter Lydig’s guns failing proof, but Peter Lydick’s guns failing.” The author of this email
labels the correct spelling of Lydig’s name just one “of Bellesiles’s incredibly inaccurate
claims.” The confusion comes from the document in Browne, et al., eds., Archives of Maryland,
which recorded Lydig as “Lydick.” While it is appropriate to retain the misspelling of a name
when a document is being quoted, it is fairly standard to use the correct spelling on all other
occasions in order to avoid confusion.
23The Second Amendment
“Bellesiles further asserts . . . that . . . the Second Amendment was written for
the sole purpose of supporting these useless bodies of men [the militia], and
not with any thought of protecting private ownership of firearms.”
I cannot find any such statements in Arming America. The Second Amendment is dis-
cussed on pages 217–18.30
Similarly, several commentators charged that Arming America, in the words of one,
“called for the repeal of the Second Amendment.” It is likely that these commentators did not
read the book they were attacking, for nowhere in Arming America is there any policy recom-
mendation of any kind on any subject. 
24William C. C. Claiborne
“[He] regularly misquotes Louisiana Governor William C. C. Claiborne’s let-
ters.”
Governor Claiborne is quoted in several places. The excerpts from Arming America are
below; followed by the text from Claiborne’s letters.31 There is an error in one of the quota-
tions, which has been corrected. Where I wrote, “must to armed and disciplined,” it should
read, “must be armed and disciplined.” Also, Jefferson appointed Claiborne the first governor
36 Michael Bellesilesof Orleans Territory in 1803, rather than 1812. Again, the interested reader may compare the
text with the source.
Arming America:
W. C. C. Claiborne served as governor of the Mississippi Territory between 1801and
1803, and Jefferson appointed him the first governor of Orleans Territory in 1812. His
letters from these posts evidence well his frustration with what he called the most
“unpleasant & difficult undertaking” of organizing the militia. He complained to Secre-
tary of State Madison in the beginning of 1802that his efforts “to organize the Militia” of
Mississippi had met “many obstacles . . . the greatest of which are the want of arms and
the means of obtaining a supply.” (p. 249)32
Claiborne to James Madison, 23January 1802:
I am making exertions to organize the Militia of this District;—but many obstacles
present, the greatest of which are the want of arms and the means of obtaining a supply.
(Official Letter Books 1: 39)
Claiborne to James Madison, 3March 1802:
The organization of the Militia at presents [present?] occupies much of my attention;—I
find it an unpleasant & difficult undertaking—But I hope, I shall at least be (partially)
successful. (Official Letter Books 1: 54)
Arming America:
Claiborne faced roughly the same difficulties in Louisiana. The militia system there “is
greatly defective.” [4: 92] Men were not showing up or not obeying orders; the best-
disciplined group was the free black regiment; one battalion, the Blues, simply dissolved
itself so as to not bother with musters; and “the muskets of several Company’s . . . have
been reported to be as totally unfit for use, and I am solicited to furnish arms, which
would enable them to render service if the occasion should require.” [4: 32] He
suggested to the local army commander that they exchange defective, privately owned
muskets for good army guns. The army agreed to supply three hundred muskets; yet
within two years Claiborne was again complaining to the legislature that the militia
“must to armed and disciplined.” [4: 297] Two years after that, in 1811, he again
“renew[ed] my entreaties for a more energetic Militia System.” [5: 124] (p. 250)33
Claiborne to Col. Freeman, 25October 1806:
The muskets of several Company’s of the Battalion of Orleans Volunteers have been
reported to be as totally unfit for use, and I am solicited to furnish arms, which would
enable them to render service if the occasion should require; the officers also command-
ing the 1st, 2d, and 4th Regiments of Militia Infantry, (and which Regiments have made
a voluntary tender of their Services), have solicited me, to supply them with arms; my
own opinion is that the state of society here, and the aspect of affairs are such, as to ren-
der it advisable to arm not only the Volunteers, but the regular city Militia; Under this
impression, therefore I shall propose to you, to receive the arms of the volunteers, which
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tains, a like number of good muskets; I shall solicit also for the use of the City Militia
nine hundred public Muskets, to be delivered to the several Colonels. (Official Letter
Books4: 32)
Claiborne to the Assembly, 13January 1807:
For myself I have supposed, that you would be enclined [sic] to a short Session, and shall
therefore press for consideration, such subjects only, as cannot well be postponed.
Among these, the revision of the Militia Law is the most important. The present system
is greatly defective; the most unvaried exertions on the part of the officers to entroduce
[sic] discipline will be of no avail, unless disobedience of orders, and improper conduct
on parade be punished with severity; unless Company musters are more frequent, and
the fines for non attendance such, as to be sensibly felt by those Citizens, who unmindful
of the injunction of the Law, can only be brought thro’ fear of a pecuniary forfeiture to
the discharge of duty. (Official Letter Books 4: 92)
Claiborne to the Assembly, 14January 1809:
The State of the Militia imposes it upon me as a duty, again to call your attention to that
subject, and to entreat you, not to close the present session, until some energetic Law, in
relation to this service is enacted. The defects in the present system are know [sic] to
every officer, and are proven by the little progress which has been made in the introduc-
tion of order & discipline. A regard to our dearest rights enjoin, that we should engraft
the character of a soldier on that of the Citizen. The young men of this Territory are not
degenerated; they are brave, hardy and enterprising; they have inherited the virtues &
possess the spirit of their fathers. But to give this spirit energy; to make it subservient to
the defense of the country, they must be armed and disciplined. (Official Letter Books 4:
297)
Claiborne to the Assembly, 29January 1811:
I could not avail myself of an occasion as favorable as the present, to renew my entreaties
for a more energetic Militia System. (Official Letter Books 5: 124)
Arming America:
Thus Governor Claiborne of Louisiana wrote the Senate that any diminishment of the
government forces stationed there endangered “the safety of the state,” for the “militia
are not & cannot for some time be made efficient [as] the Want of Arms & munitions of
War, are sources of great embarrassment.” He begged them to loan the state at least
thirty-four hundred muskets and four hundred sabers. Or, as he put it to the local army
commander, “the militia of Louisiana, is for the present in a state of Great Derange-
ment.” (p. 256)
Claiborne to Louisiana Senators, 10June 1813:
But it is my duty to state to you, & to urge you, Gentlemen to represent to the Govern-
ment, that the regular Force in this quarter cannot be deminished [sic] without endan-
gering the safety of the state.—The militia are not & cannot for some time be made
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and I renew to you my entreaties to effect if possible from the Government, the loan of
three thousand four hundred muskets & four hundred sabres. 
(Official Letter Books 6: 220–21)
Claiborne to General Flournoy, 17June 1813:
I am very sensible of the dangers to which this state is exposed from within & without,
and the expediency of taking in time precautionary measures! Among these the holding
in readiness for active service, a strong Detachment of militia, is Certainly of primary
importance,—and orders to that effect shal [sic] be issued.—It is however with Con-
cern, I inform you, that the militia of Louisiana, is for the present in a state of Great
Derangement. (Official Letter Books 6: 226, emphases in orignal)
Arming America:
Governor Claiborne of Louisiana complained to Secretary of War Monroe of this
“scarcity of arms” among the arriving militia, who added nothing to the city’s defense.
While the New Orleans volunteer militia was well armed, “The militia in the Interior of
the State are almost wholly destitute of arms.”(p. 259)
Claiborne to James Monroe, 25October 1814:
The militia in the Interior of the State are almost wholly destitute of arms, they are very
pressing in their demands on me, and it is with regret that I find myself without the
means of arming them.—Fifteen hundred stand of muskets have been furnished the
State by the General Government, a thousand of which are in the hands of the detached
militia, and the remaining five hundred are reserve for the use of such corps as are
expected to volunteer their services.—I have convoked the Legislature for the tenth of
next month, and one object of the Call is to invite them to make provisions for the pur-
chase of arms; but should this be done, I fear they cannot be had in this City.—could the
General Government loan to Louisiania [sic] two or three hundred Sabres, and of as
many of horseman’s Pistols, it would indeed by a great accommodation, and add more to
our security, for on the event of insurrection among our slaves, Cavalry are the troops
which can act with greatest advantage. (Official Letter Books 6: 290)
Claiborne to James Monroe, 4January 1815:
We have to lament for the moment a scarcity of arms, but are hourly in expectation of an
Ample Supply which the General is informed has left Pittsburg some time since. 
(Official Letter Books 6: 330)
Arming America:
Nonetheless, Claiborne insisted that they needed sabers for their cavalry, which “is best
adapted to the Climate of Louisiana.” These guns took a long time to arrive, finally all
reaching New Orleans after the war was over. Until then, Claiborne complained about
his “unarmed, & undisciplined Militia.” (p. 526n178)
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I am honored with the receipt of your letter of the 22June, informing me “That two
thousand Stand of Arms, will be deposited with the deputy quarter Master General at
Pittsburg . . .” This supply of Arms will be a great acquisition to Louisiana, & I have only
to regret the delay in their transportation to New Orleans.—This State would be much
accomodated [sic] if you would supply her also with 150Sabres;—The service of Cavalry
is best adapted to the Climate of Louisiana, and in many parts of this State (in the West-
ern prairies for example) are the only troops that could act with advantage. (Official
Letter Books 6: 243)34
Claiborne to Thomas Flournoyy, 17September 1813:
Were my means equal to my wishes, you would find a prompt & firm supporter, but
with an unarmed, & undisciplined Militia, I can only offer you partial aid.—You must
have heard of the opposition in New Orleans, to my orders for holding in readiness for
service a detachment of Militia. (Official Letter Books 6: 269)
25Media Images
“Arming America is another familiar example of history being rewritten to
make the past conform to the media’s prevailing opinion of the present.” 
This is a baffling formulation, as I am not certain what in Arming America matched “the
media’s prevailing opinion of the present.” Since, to my knowledge, the media has consis-
tently reinforced the perception that Americans have always been fascinated with firearms,
Arming America would seem to be at variance with the media. But specific examples have not
been offered.
26The Burning of Washington
“[His] long quotation from Colonel Minor’s description of the fall of Wash-
ington does not appear in his cited source.”
Colonel George Minor’s testimony appears on page 255 of Arming America and matches
the cited source in the first volume of American State Papers: Military Affairs. There is a slight
error in the quotation, as a comma has been omitted following the word “ammunition” and
before “&c.” Otherwise the quotations are correct. I reproduce most of Minor’s statement to
demonstrate that his experience matches the larger point made in this chapter that the militia
was both ill equipped and ill organized (note, for instance, Colonel Carbery returning to his
home for the evening before the battle).
In October 1814Colonel George Minor testified before Richard M. Johnson’s House
committee that was investigating the fall of Washington, D.C. Minor, in command of
Virginia’s 60th Regiment, arrived at Washington with six hundred infantry and one
hundred cavalry. He found his troops grievously short of arms, reporting personally to
President Madison “as to the want of arms, ammunition &c.” Madison sent him to Gen-
eral Armstrong, who told him that “arms, &c. could not be had that night, and directed
me to report myself next morning to Colonel Carbery, who would furnish me with
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hour in the forenoon, without being able to find him, and then went in search of Gen-
eral [William] Winder.” He found Winder and was told to wait. As a consequence, this
regiment, described by General Winder as “wholly unarmed,” never saw battle.
Colonel George Minor’s statement appears in American State Papers: Military Affairs and
reads as follows:
In answer to the several interrogatories made by Colonel R. M. Johnson, chairman of the
inquiry into the causes of the destruction of the public buildings in the city of Washing-
ton, as hereunto annexed, state as follows, viz:
On Friday, the 19th of August last, was informed (not officially) of the collect-
ing of the enemy’s forces in our waters, namely the Potomac and Patuxent. Immediately
issues orders for the regiment under my command to assemble at Wren’s tavern on the
Tuesday following. . . . And on Monday evening, the 22d, received a verbal message
from the President, by Mr. John Graham, to hasten on the troops which had been
ordered from my regiment, which will more fully appear by said Graham’s letter to
General Winder, to which I beg leave to refer the committee; and, after informing Mr.
Graham the purport of the orders I had received, we both concluded it would be proper
for him to return to Washington, and have the orders, first alluded to, countermanded,
so as to justify me in marching with my whole force to the city; which consisted, as well
as I can recollect, of six hundred infantry and about one hundred cavalry; and the said
Graham returned to Wren’s tavern on Tuesday evening, the 23d, with General Winder’s
orders, written on the same letter to which I have referred the committee. On the receipt
of which, I took up my line of march immediately, and arrived at the capitol between
sunset and dark, and immediately made my way to the President and reported my
arrival, when he referred me to General Armstrong, to whom I repaired, and informed
him as to the strength of the troops, as well as to the want of arms, ammunition, &c.
which made it as late as early candle light, when I was informed by that gentleman the
arms, &c. could not be had that night, and directed me to report myself next morning to
Colonel Carbery, who would furnish me with arms, &c.; which gentleman, from early
next morning, I diligently sought for, until a late hour in the forenoon, without being
able to find him, and then went in search of General Winder, whom I found near the
Eastern Branch; when he gave an order to the armorer for the munitions wanting, with
orders to return to the capitol, there to await further orders.
On my arrival at the armory, found that department in the care of a very young
man, who dealt out the stores cautiously, which went greatly to consume time; as, for
instance, when flints were once counted by my officers, who showed every disposition to
expedite the furnishing the men, the young man had to count them over again, before
they could be obtained, and at which place I met with Colonel Carbery, who introduced
himself to me, and apologized for not being found when I was in search of him, stating
that he had left town the evening before, and had gone to his country. After getting the
men equipped, I ordered them on to the capitol, and waited myself to sign the receipts
for the munitions furnished; and, on my arrival, was informed by Major Hunter, who
commanded in my absence, orders had been given to march to Bladensburg, when we
took up our march for that place, and met the retreating army on this side the turnpike
gate, and was ordered by one of General Winder’s aids to form the line of battle on a
height near that place, and was soon after ordered by the General in person to throw
back my regiment from that position, into sections, and to wait until the retreating army
had passed, and cover their retreat; and immediately after sent his aid to direct me to
countermarch immediately, and come on to the capitol. 
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Winder directed me to march them on, without telling me where; of course I marched
with the other troops until I came to the six buildings, where I took the left hand road,
leading to the foundry, and there occupied the nearest height to that place, and sent the
adjutant to find where the General had made his rallying point, and was informed at
Tenlytown, where I marched that evening, and found the troops moving off to encamp
at some convenient place on the river road, where I followed on until I saw two barns,
where I made to, and rested for the night. Next morning sought for General Winder;
met him on the road leading from Tenlytown, to where my troops lay, when he ordered
me to Montgomery Court House, and from thence to Baltimore. Given under my hand,
city of Washington, 30th of October, 1814. George Minor, Colonel Commandant 60th
Regiment Virginia Militia. (1: 568–69)
27James Fenimore Cooper 
“Bellesiles should have begun his research by reading the fiction of James
Fenimore Cooper, in which the ability to shoot accurately is highly admired,
and gun ownership on the frontier . . . was a natural thing.” 
While it is interesting advice that an historian should begin her or his research with fic-
tion, I did discuss the work of Cooper on pages 303, 322, and 344–47. I do not know of any
passage in Cooper holding that gun ownership was common or “a natural thing” on the fron-
tier. 
28The Militia
“Bellesiles is rewriting history, ignoring the well known fact that tens of
thousands of American farmers rushed forth with their arms to defeat the
British in the American Revolution.” 
This comment addresses a popular image of the American Revolution that historians
generally refer to as “the militia myth.” In this mythology, yeoman farmers stepped from their
plows, grabbed their trusty muskets from above the mantel, and went forth to do battle
against the British for eight years. As Charles Patrick Neimeyer has written, no myth has
proven more difficult to combat. “Contrary to popular lore and some modern commentators,
the well-to-do and ‘yeoman farmers’ seemed to prefer staying home rather than rushing to the
front lines.”35 Military historians have devoted a great deal of energy to demolishing this
myth over the past fifty years,36 and yet their efforts have failed to affect popular percep-
tions.37
Those who foster the militia myth must do so in the face of overwhelming evidence to
the contrary. Nearly every officer who served during the Revolution, including militia com-
manders, spoke of the failings of the militia, while the biggest problem facing the Continental
Army was a lack of volunteers. In January 1776, Washington imagined an army of 75,000. His
was not an unreasonable projection, as conservative estimates put the colonies’ white male
population aged sixteen to fifty in 1775 at 350,000. Washington hoped for just one-fifth of
those. Even had just one-twelfth of these white men served every year, Washington would
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when he could call on 19,000 troops. For most of the war he was lucky to have six or seven
thousand combat-ready forces. 
Alexander Graydon’s recruitment efforts are fairly typical in this regard. He searched
desperately for volunteers, using many of the same methods made notorious by recruiters for
the British army, including getting the “volunteers” drunk. In 1776 he wrote of a group who
“drank freely of our liquor,” but had apparently agreed beforehand to keep one another from
enlisting. Graydon gained one short-term recruit by striking him “with the utmost force
between the eyes.” The best he could do in another place was “to recruit, a fellow . . . who
would do to stop a bullet as well as a better man.” This recruit “was a truly worthless dog,” but
the town was “much indebted to us for taking him away.” Graydon wrote of the “error of
those who seem to conceive the year 1776 to have been a season of almost universal patriotic
enthusiasm.”38That error persists.
This lack of general public support extended even to supplying the Continental Army
with the essentials for both combat and survival. As Wayne Carp titled his excellent book on
the subject, the public seemed content “To Starve the Army at Pleasure.”39 Throughout the
war, the army suffered while the general populace prospered. Even the famous near famine of
Valley Forge occurred after a successful harvest in the middle states; but farmers preferred to
sell their crops to the British who could pay with hard currency, rather than the poverty-
stricken American forces who paid with paper. 
Washington offered an excellent assessment of the situation in a letter to John Hancock
dated September 24, 1776, on “the eve of another dissolution of our Army.” Given their poor
treatment, Washington told the President of Congress, it was not surprising that his soldiers
would not re-enlist. Nor could they expect any assistance from the militia. “To place any
dependence upon militia is assuredly resting upon a broken staff; men just dragged from the
tender scenes of domestic life; unaccustomed to the din of arms; totally unacquainted with
every kind of military skill, which being followed by a want of confidence in themselves,
when opposed to troops regularly trained, disciplined, and appointed; superior in knowledge,
and superior in arms, makes them timid and ready to fly from their own shadows.” The only
option was to offer greater inducements and better support in return for longer terms of mili-
tary service. That the British had not already defeated the Americans was due solely to their
failure to take “proper advantage” of the situation.40
29The First Gun Count
“In Bellesiles’s first supposed gun count in the new world, he uses this source
to show that settlers in Massachusetts Bay were only 10 percent armed, when
it actually shows the plan to arm every man.”
The count for the Massachusetts Bay Company is not the “first gun count” in Arming
America. There are numbers given for French and Spanish expeditions on pages 40and 47, for
Quebec on page 49, Jamestown in 1609 on pages 52–53, and 1611 on page 55, and Smythe’s
Hundred in 1618on page 56. 
The passage in question appears on page 63and reads as follows: 
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New England settlers were desperate for firearms and powder. As in the Chesapeake
Bay, the exception was in the first wave of settlement, when so many settlers died that
there were enough guns for use by the survivors. In 1630the Massachusetts Bay Com-
pany reported in their possession: “80bastard musketts, with snaphances, 4Foote in the
barrill without rests; 6long Fowlinge peeces . . . 6foote longe; 4longe Fowlinge peeces . . .
51/2foote longe; 10Full musketts, 4Foote barrill, with matchlocks and rests,” one hun-
dred swords and “5peeces of ordnance, long sence bowght and payd For.”
This accusation of error lifts a single quotation out of context, in this case from both 
Arming America and the original document. First it should be noted that the context of the
quotation in Arming America is that the settlers had “enough guns.” The cited document,
which is published in Nathaniel Shurtleff’s five volume compilation on the Massachusetts Bay
Company,41refers to plans for the voyage of the settlers in 1630. They had not yet left England
and were in the process of planning their journey. The first volume of Shurtleff’s collection, as
he says in his introduction, covers the preparations for the journey. This list dated 1628 could
not represent what is in Boston on that date as they have not yet left. Rather, what we see in
these pages are company plans. We can trace the progress of the buying of arms for the settle-
ment at Boston in this volume, as well as the Company’s intention that all firearms were to be
“equally devided amongst the sevverall plantations” to be kept in “readynes as a towne
stocke.”42They succeeded in acquiring everything on their list on page 26, making it correct, I
contend, to state that this was the total armory for that first settlement in 1630. 
Mine is not an eccentric reading of these documents. The highly respected arms expert,
Harold L. Peterson, makes the same sense of this evidence in his well known Arms and Armor
in Colonial America, 1526-1783 [(New York, 1956), 44.] Peterson provides the same list I do in
Arming America, introducing it as follows: “With the coming of the settlers to Massachusetts
Bay in 1630, however, the transition began in earnest. The common arms supply of the Massa-
chusetts Bay Company contained . . .” He has an almost identical passage in his more thor-
ough study, “The Military Equipment of the Plymouth and Bay Colonies, 1620–1690,” [The
New England Quarterly 20 (1947): 204.] M. L. Brown offers a similar reading of these sources
in Firearms in Colonial America: The Impact on History and Technology, 1492–1792 [(Washing-
ton, D.C., 1980), 85–87.]
30An English Bookseller
“[Dunton] was not a ‘Massachusetts Soldier,’ but rather an English book-
seller. . . . Bellesiles offers Dunton’s letter as evidence of a shortage of guns,
American unfamiliarity with guns, and a preference for pikes. . . . Arming
America mistakenly shifts the date of this date to five years closer to King
Philip’s War, and Bellesiles uses the source to support his contention that
there were gun shortages during the war.”
John Dunton was a former English bookseller and a soldier in service to the colony of
Massachusetts. Many other men serving in New England were born in England. Since this
paragraph is about the province of Massachusetts turning to the greater use of firearms, I did
not see why it was necessary to give biographical information about the person being quoted,
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charge that Dunton’s quotation is intended to show “a preference for pikes” is untrue. Rather,
the point is made that pikes were no longer favored, but used out of necessity.
The note to this paragraph in Arming America (pp. 487–88n23) has six sources. While all
the quotations are correct, the date of 1681 is inaccurate; it should indeed read 1686. This was
a typographical or transcription error, the year 1686 appearing as 1681, and it has been cor-
rected in the second edition of the book. I cannot see, however, how the altered date changes
the meaning of the paragraph. A motive is ascribed, that of shifting the date to support the
“contention that there were gun shortages during the war.” Yet the very next sentence after
the Dunton quotation, which is not quoted by the author of this criticism, states that England
“supplied several hundred muskets.” That closing sentence reinforces the topic sentence of
this paragraph, also not quoted in the criticism: “It was in King Philip’s War that the musket
became the weapon of choice for American militia.” 
Mine is not an unusual reading of the documents in question. One of the finest military
historians of early America, Don Higginbotham, used exactly the same document in almost
precisely the same fashion: “Young John Dunton was not alone in conceding that he ‘knew
not how to shoot off a musket’ and that his fellow militiamen ‘knew it well enough by my
awkward handling’ of one.”43 Jack S. Radabaugh also read this source in the same way in his
study of the Massachusetts militia.44
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Matters of Interpretation
Historians’ practices of citation and quotation have rarely lived up to their
precepts; footnotes have never supported, and can never support, every
statement of fact in a given work.
—Anthony Grafton1
I
t is of course fair to disagree with any scholar’s interpretation of a cited
source or with the entire thesis of any book. For instance what I see as a
limited and insufficient supply of firearms can be interpreted as a great many by another
reader. Whenever we deal with numbers there is a core question of presentation. Do we say
“only 20 percent,” or “as much as 20 percent”? Likewise, raising contrary evidence, as I
attempt to do in my book, is a legitimate aspect of all scholarship. All good scholars hope that
their research will inspire an informed discussion and learned disagreement. I trust that the
following issues can be treated as part of a fair and honest exchange of opinion. 
1Incorrect Number of Homicides in Colonial Virginia
“[T]en white murder suspects were sentenced to death by the Virginia 
General Court—a fraction of all murder suspects in Virginia in those years,
most of whom fled prosecution or were discharged after hearings before
coroners’ inquests, justices of the peace, or county courts.” 
This critique asserts that the original source, Arthur P. Scott, Criminal Law in Colonial
Virginia, is misrepresented in the following passage from Arming America: 
A study of eighteen years of Virginia’s seventeenth-century court records discovered
twenty-three murder trials resulting in eleven homicide and four manslaughter convic-
tions, or less than one murder a year. In the four years of 1736to 1739, there were ten
murders in Virginia, a notable increase to two and a half murders per year. (p. 82)
The accuracy of the first figure on the seventeenth century, the accuracy of Scott’s study
and my use of it are not questioned. Rather it is charged that I failed to reference those cases in
which “the murder suspects” fled or were discharged. It is conceivable that those discharged
were innocent, that a murder had not been committed, or any of a number of other possibilities.
Chapter FiveMore significantly, no source has been provided for the large numbers of cases not brought to
trial, nor does Scott make any reference to such avoidances of the legal procedures. Scott does
write that in the years after 1736, “Perhaps the examining courts, which by now were in opera-
tion, were allowing fewer doubtful cases to reach the capital.” He adds that “Only 1manslaugh-
ter case appears” in these years.2
Historians must rely on the available evidence . I know of no source to validate the asser-
tion that many murders were not brought to trial, though there may be such, and Scott’s views
on the Colonial Virginia criminal courts are supported by the more recent study of Peter C.
Hoffer and William B. Scott. This more thorough examination of the Richmond County
Courts, including material discovered since Scott’s 1930work, found a total of eighteen homi-
cide cases in the years 1714 to 1749 inclusive. That total is 4.3 percent of all criminal cases
heard, for an average of one murder every other year, a much lower incidence of murder than
discovered by Arthur Scott. Professor Hoffer notes that “some defendants, rather than risk
trial and conviction in the General Court, pleaded guilty.” The one reference to flight to avoid
conviction observes that the man’s son was then charged with being an accessory, the court
having no patience for those who sought to avoid justice. “Anglo-American jurists generally
took a harsh view of crime, and Richmond County judges were no exception.” Nine of these
suspected murderers (“that many” or “only” may be applied) “were in any way judged culpa-
ble and either punished or held for trial.”3 Like Arthur Scott, I took a conviction as evidence
of murder. However, it may be correct that the clause in my sentence should be changed to
read either “twelve murder trials” or “ten murder convictions.” But either way, the meaning
of the passage remains unchanged.
The critic quoted above is incorrect, however, in writing that “Scott examined the sur-
viving issues of the Virginia Gazette from September 10, 1736, to February 1, 1740.” Scott
wrote that he examined surviving court records, “memorandum in the British Record
Office,” and the Virginia Gazette for the years between 1736 and 1774, finding capital cases in
the years “1736–39, 1766–69, and 1771–74.”4
Every historian to my knowledge who has worked on homicide among the European
settlers in colonial America has been struck with the low number of cases. That may be
because there were few murders, or because few homicides were finding their way into the
courts. Many homicide cases heard would strike modern jurists as highly suspect. Elaine For-
man Crane’s fascinating recent study of “the only fully recorded case of matricide in colonial
America” is particularly interesting in this regard.5There was absolutely no evidence that the
victim, Rebecca Cornell, had in fact been murdered and the initial inquest ruled her death a
tragic accident. But spectral evidence, a vague statement by Cornell’s ghost to her brother and
the fact that her corpse bled in the presence of her son Thomas, led to the conviction and exe-
cution of Thomas Cornell for murder. Any scholar counting homicides would have to include
the Cornell case as a homicide, but it remains problematic.
2Homicide in Colonial Plymouth
Whereas Bellesiles found “not a single case of homicide” in the first forty-six
years of Plymouth Colony’s courts, there were in fact “11cases of murder and
[the court] investigated 4additional deaths that may have been murders.”
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which I reference the court records for Plymouth Plantation during the forty-six years from
1636to 1681, inclusive. As part of a general point that “Whites rarely assaulted other whites in
the colonies,” I found “not a single homicide” in the Plymouth court records in those years.
The statement in Arming America is based upon and cites only volume 7 of Nathaniel B.
Shurtleff, and David Pulsifer, eds., Records of the Colony of New Plymouth, which contains the
court records for Plymouth Colony.6 I certainly erred in not looking in the other volumes of
this series. However, I read these records very differently from the critic quoted above and
disagree with the assertion that there were at least eleven homicides between 1636 and 1681. 
To repeat, the statement in Arming America drawing upon these records is in the context
of an examination of the commonalty of white-on-white violence. The first case in volume
one concerns the 1638 murder of “Penowanyanquis, an Indian.”7 The second is the 1648 con-
viction of Alice Bishop for slitting the throat of her four-year-old daughter.8 That case is fol-
lowed by a hearing, not a trial, of Walter Baker, “suspected” of murder but cleared with no
charges brought.9Three of the documents in the third volume are inquests into deaths: one of
a man who froze to death while hunting with no suspicion of foul play, another of an inden-
tured servant who was forced to work outside in severe cold while ill,10and the third to a man
who was pushed and died shortly thereafter.11 Only the latter suggests homicide, though the
presentment does not carry that charge and the defendant was found not guilty. The fourth
case in this volume is a probate hearing on the proper disposition of the estate of Ephraim
Hickes who “died a violent death,” which in the seventeenth century could mean fits or
falling down. Through an oversight, the court’s order “that the said estate should be improved
for the comfort and support of Mistris Margarett Hickes, the mother of the said Ephraim”
had not been recorded. It is difficult to discern the homicide here.12
One of the documents in volume five is an inquest into a death with no reference to mur-
der.13 There is also a coroner’s inquest resulting in the discovery of “noe wound nor bruise
that might hasten his [James Browne’s] death.”14 The other is definitely a homicide: the trial
and execution of three Indians for killing John Sassamon, whose body had been found under
the ice of a pond in February 1675. Many people, including the deputy governor of Rhode
Island, denied that Sassamon had been murdered, holding that he had fallen through the ice.
The trial—which included supernatural evidence—and executions precipitated King Philip’s
War.15 Not only is this not a white-on-white crime, it was perceived as an act of war by Meta-
com and the Wampanoags, and so I treated it in Arming America. Since the Indians were not
inhabitants of Plymouth Colony, the court’s jurisdiction is suspect.16 Nonetheless, one may
put forth a different interpretation and treat this as a homicide rather than judicial murder.
The remaining citations refer to a ten-year-old boy falling to his death “through the flore of
the saw mill,”17 and deaths during the war, with the defendants referred to as prisoners of
war.18
The citations in the sixth19 and seventh20 volumes fall outside the period of my study,
while volume eight is a list of births and marriages, 1666 to 1671, with no reference to homi-
cide.21 Interestingly, the sole reference to a gun in any of these cases comes in 1684, with the
indictment of “Robert Trayes, negro,” for the accidental shooting of Daniel Standlake. Stand-
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Trayes was not charged with any crime, but given a stern lecture.22
The definition of murder is stretched rather thin in including cases of accidental death,
probate hearings, and birth records. Likewise, in the absence of further evidence it is second-
guessing the jury to find declarations of innocence indications of homicides. Nonetheless, it is
correct that there were two legally proven murders in the period covered with which I was
unfamiliar: the murder of Penowanyanquis in 1638 and the young child killed by her mother
in 1648, though only the latter is a white-on-white homicide. I regret having failed to examine
volume three of this series, and the sentence in question has been corrected to read: “Only one
murder is mentioned in the records of New Haven colony, while in forty-six years, 1636
through 1681, Plymouth colony’s courts returned one white on white homicide conviction, an
infanticide.” 
3Homicides in Colonial North Carolina
“[Bellesiles] states that there were 43 criminal actions for murder in North
Carolina, 1663–1740, but his source, Donna Spindel, notes that her data is
incomplete, because of long, irregular gaps in the colony’s court records, and
because ‘dramatic dips’ occurred in the number of criminal prosecutions dur-
ing periods of ‘political turmoil.’”
This critique does not flaw the cited statement from Arming America, which reads:
There were 559criminal actions in North Carolina between 1663and 1740, 43of which
(7.7percent) were murders, an average of one homicide every two years. (p. 82)
Rather, it is here maintained that the flaws in the sources negate the statement.
Every historian understands that we are limited by our sources. Any statement based on
a source document or upon the research of others carries with it the implicit qualification
“insofar as we are able to know given the limitations of the sources cited.” Even though it is a
given of historical research, I note in several places in Arming Americathat all data is problem-
atic. I assumed that most readers would grow weary of the reiteration of this obvious point;
certainly scholars work on the understanding that it is not necessary to offer a close examina-
tion of every source used.
One may argue, however, that the average reader is unaware of these limitations and
needs to be reminded regularly. A few critics, including the one quoted above, have main-
tained that it is preferable to stop and consider precisely the flaws and limitations of every
piece of evidence employed. To take this single paragraph on page 82 of Arming America that
considers white-on-white violence, the following sources were used to arrive at the nine pieces
of discreet information:
J. M. Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England, 1660–1800 (Princeton, NJ,
1986);
Cornelia Hughes Dayton, Women Before the Bar: Gender, Law, and Society in
Connecticut, 1639–1789(Chapel Hill, NC, 1995);
Clive Emsley, Crime and Society in England, 1750–1900(London, 1996);
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from 1638to 1649(Hartford, CT, 1857);
Hugh F. Rankin, Criminal Trial Proceedings in the General Court of Colonial
Virginia (Williamsburg, VA, 1965);
D. Rumbelow, I Spy Blue: The Police and Crime in the City of London from
Elizabeth I to Victoria (London, 1971);
Arthur P. Scott, Criminal Law in Colonial Virginia (Chicago, 1930);
J. A. Sharpe, Crime in Early Modern England, 1550–1750(London, 1984);
Nathaniel B. Shurtleff, and David Pulsifer, eds., Records of the Colony of New
Plymouth in New England,10vols. (Boston, 1855–1861);
Donna J. Spindel and Stuart W. Thomas, Jr., “Crime and Society in North
Carolina, 1663–1740,” in Eric H. Monkkonen, ed., Crime and Justice in
American History: The Colonies and Early Republic, 2 vols. (Westport,
CT., 1991) 2: 699–720.
In addition, my footnotes to this paragraph refer to contrary interpretations by Joyce Lee
Malcolm [To Keep and Bear Arms: The Origins of an Anglo-American Right (Cambridge, MA,
1994)] and Carl Bridenbaugh [Cities in the Wilderness: The First Century of Urban Life in Amer-
ica, 1625–1742(New York, 1955)].
To provide a proper evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of each of these sources
would have required, I calculate, an additional eight to ten paragraphs. Is it necessary to reca-
pitulate the precise aspects of a source when the author being cited has already done so? Such
an approach to scholarship would have the advantage of absolute clarity while walking the
reader carefully through the material. It is unlikely that such a technique could possibly work
in any book seeking to make use of more than a few sources. Perhaps a disclaimer should
appear on the bottom of each page, “Warning: all historical data suffer from some limita-
tions.”
Incidentally, the critic quoted above is incorrect in writing that I cite Spindel, Crime and
Society in North Carolina.23 Rather, the footnote in Arming America cites the article Spindel
wrote with Stuart W. Thomas, Jr., “Crime and Society in North Carolina, 1663–1740.” I
should have cited Spindel, Crime and Society, for that is where she discusses the limitations of
her records. As Professor Spindel writes, “This material represents virtually the only docu-
mentary evidence from the colony’s early history.”24There is no such thing as a perfect source.
Every form of evidence reflects some process of subjective selection or accidental survival.
Archives sadly do not contain everything from the past, and even they occasionally lose docu-
ments through fires, floods, and other forms of mishap. And, as is well known, documents
now much admired by scholars, such as the letters of workers, women, and members of
minority groups, were once thought to be so much ephemera. Nonetheless, historians do the
best they can within the limitations imposed by the nature of the evidence. In the absence of
alternatives, historians can draw upon these flawed sources or remain silent. 
4According to the Sources Cited
“[H]is numbers often directly contradict one another.”
This complaint, along with one that I use the “wrong” numbers or “incorrect” interpre-
tations of events, appears often in the critiques of Arming America. Several critics charge an
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not always agree—for instance both the censuses of 1850 and 1860 (pp.384–85) and the Secre-
tary of the Treasury’s surveys of manufacturers in 1833 and 1858 (pp.386–86). These surveys
did come up with different statistics; but then they were conducted by different methods in
different years. Generally critics have demanded to know which figures are correct, not con-
ceding that it is possible that I am not attempting to state categorically that any of them are
completely accurate. In fact I state the contrary on several occasions, writing that all these
numbers should be taken as tentative. Nonetheless, the numbers are those reported in the
cited sources. 
5Failure to Appreciate Anecdotal Evidence 
“Bellesiles must be wrong, as my parents, who lived in Montana, owned sev-
eral guns, and all of our neighbors owned guns.”
Many critics complain about the failure of Arming Americato match the writer’s personal
experiences. The anecdotal is generally a family story or heirloom that falls well outside the
period covered in this book. Thus the criticism above is no doubt correct; but Arming America
ends in 1877. Another critic wrote, “I am sitting on the front porch of the plantation house
that has been in my family since the 1740s.” This writer then insists that everything in Arming
America must be false since he still owns an old gun that one of his ancestors used in the Civil
War. He concludes, “Need I add that my family estate is on the National Registry of Historic
Houses.” No, no need at all. My research indicates that his was exactly the sort of family that
was most likely to own a gun, in fact, many guns: rich slave-owners. One writer in a business
paper denied the research in Arming America because every character in the computer game
“Oregon Trail” can access a gun. Anecdotal evidence like this is difficult to interpret, though
very valuable for those scholars attempting to get at the construction of images of the past.
6Attitude toward “the South”
“[H]e hates Southerners, making the Southern militia into a lynch mob and
Southern men into vicious killers.” 
Several commentators find Arming America biased against an entire region of the United
States. The review above, as well as several others, paraphrase a sentence on page 356 of Arm-
ing America: “This was the southern white male’s preferred mode of violence, beating an
unarmed opponent.” This sentence is within the context of Preston Brooks’ caning of Senator
Charles Sumner in 1856. The next sentence after the quote reads, “After all, it was how they
treated their slaves.” It is possible to read this and other passages as demonstrating an unfavor-
able attitude toward Southern white male slave-owners, but it is also important to note that
those slaves were Southerners as well. 
There is room for an interesting historical discussion here, which Arming America does
attempt to address. How do we measure and evaluate violence in the antebellum South?
There are those, including many of my critics, who emphasize violence among Southern men,
with special attention to the duel, while downplaying violence against slaves. Arming America
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(and almost never with firearms), especially when compared with white violence against
African Americans. The insistence of many modern white Southerners that there is some-
thing glorious in the militaristic spirit and manly violence of Southern whites as demonstrated
in dueling and the “Lost Cause,” while insisting that violence against slaves is grossly exagger-
ated, poses an intriguing issue worthy of analysis.25 I may be wrong about the level of white-
on-white violence, but much more research is required before we can be certain. I do not
think I am incorrect regarding the high levels of violence against slaves and cite a number of
recent studies to support that reading of the past.
7The Duke of Cumberland
“He says, for example, that the Duke of Cumberland’s imperial ambitions
drew Britain’s American colonies into the Seven Years’ War. . . . [J]ust the
opposite was true.” 
Nowhere do I write that “Cumberland’s imperial ambitions drew Britain’s American
colonies into the Seven Years’ War.” The summary statement on page 143 of Arming America
says:
This great and bloody victory also elevated “Butcher” Cumberland to a position of great
authority within the British government; and he used his authority to encourage a more
militaristic imperial expansion that would produce the Seven Years’ War and lead to his
own downfall.
I believe that the literature on the period upholds the perspective that Cumberland
attained great power within the government after Culloden and promoted militarist policies
that brought on the Seven Years’ War and ultimately led to his own political demise. 
Curiously, the critic quoted above cites Fred Anderson’s Crucible of War to support the
contention that “just the opposite was true.” Arming America draws upon Anderson’s out-
standing book, among others, in constructing the historic context of chapter 5. Anderson finds
that Cumberland selected Braddock for command in North America and set the aggressive
policy he was to pursue, while the duke of Newcastle blamed the duke of Cumberland for the
disasters that ensued. Cumberland, as Anderson writes, was “notable for favoring military
action over diplomacy.” By the age of twenty-six, Cumberland “was already captain-general
of the British army and the most powerful military figure in Britain. By 1754he had grown to
truly formidable dimensions in both girth and political influence.” “Allowing him too great
an influence in formulating a response to the French victory on the Ohio [Ft. Duquesne],
Newcastle knew, might be the greatest threat of all to peace.”26 Yet that is exactly what hap-
pened, for Newcastle could not halt Cumberland’s rise. It was Cumberland who bore respon-
sibility for the plans that would bring on the war with France. Braddock, who “had been the
duke of Cumberland’s choice to assume the supreme command in North America,” “consid-
ered himself bound to proceed according to the instructions he received from Cumberland’s
hand.” Anderson adds, “American military initiatives . . . originated with Cumberland.”27
Cumberland’s father, King George II, also blamed Cumberland for bringing on the war.28 In
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again, alternative interpretations are legitimate and welcome.
8“Defeating”the Indians in the 1760s
Bellesiles argues “that the British had less trouble conquering Canada than
defeating the Indians of South Carolina and the Old Northwest, . . . the oppo-
site was true.” 
I am not sure how the opposite could be true, when the British did not defeat the Indians
of South Carolina and the Old Northwest. Rather, the point of this section of chapter 5 is that
the British declared themselves victorious without having defeated the Indians. Instead they
signed treaties acknowledging Indian rights to their lands and established the Proclamation
Line to keep white settlers out of Indian territories so as to avoid further wars. The Indians
did suffer grievously, especially from the burning of their towns and fields by British troops,
but they held out until the British recognized their rights. The critic quoted above also turns
to Fred Anderson for validation, yet no where does Professor Anderson write that the British
defeated the Cherokee or broke Pontiac’s Rebellion. Here is Anderson’s summary: 
Even if the rebel [Indian] leaders had not been able to awaken and restore their French
father, they could scarcely have failed to note that at the end of the war the British
repealed every policy to which the Indians had objected. With the treaties of peace,
diplomatic gift-giving resumed; limitations on the trade in powder, shot, and arms
ended; the trade in alcohol opened once again. The Indians had forcibly instructed the
newcomers in what residence in the pays d’en hautrequired of them.29
9Cowpens
“Bellesiles appears to show a strong bias against the militia concept in his
description of the Revolutionary War battle of Cowpens.”
This author does not question my sources, but rather insists that I disagree with some
web sites. As Professor Joan Gunderson responded to this particular statement:
Historians do differ on the degree of orderliness in the militia’s retirement from the field
at Cowpens, but that is typical of historical interpretation. We don’t all read the same
evidence in the same way.
Professor Richard Bernstein added what should be obvious to any student of history:
People can read historical evidence differently and draw different conclusions from that
evidence.30
Repeatedly, critics of Arming America find it difficult to accept that people can disagree
on how to interpret a specific historic event or body of evidence. And yet, without such a will-
ingness to disagree, history would quickly become dormant, as lifeless as any tyranny’s official
story. 
54 Michael Bellesiles10The Anti-Federalists
“The anti-federalists wanted every man to bear arms.”
I could not disagree more. I think that there is very persuasive evidence, some of which I
supply in the pages of Arming America, that the anti-federalists did indeed join in granting
state governments authority to limit membership in the militia. They also supported the dis-
arming of radicals when they saw social order threatened, and I provide some examples. This
position is, I believe, supported by a number of scholars, such as Jack Rakove, Saul Cornell,
and Don Higginbotham.31 I think it is entirely incorrect that the anti-federalists wanted
“Every Man Armed.” I know of no evidence to that effect, and given the fear of slave rebellion
and Indian “uprisings” among many of the anti-federalists, I am puzzled by such an assertion.
Nonetheless, I think it an error to treat the anti-federalists—or the federalists for that mat-
ter—as a single voice; there was no consensus. But most importantly in this context, this is a
disagreement not an error, and I maintain that there is a fundamental difference between the
two. 
11Union Guns
“It is not true that ‘the number and quality of Union firearms determined the
outcome of the [Civil] War’32. . . most historians would insist on a more com-
prehensive explanation.” 
I agree entirely. Arming America does not argue that the greater productive capacity of
the North alone explains the outcome, but rather proposes that we should pay more attention
to “the number and quality of Union firearms” in our examinations of the war. This single
sentence is part of a larger and perhaps new perspective on the Civil War. But rather than dis-
missing new ideas out of hand as just plain wrong, is it not better to engage with the particu-
lars and test them against the historic record?
12. Axes 
“He misquotes Frederick Gerstaecker, who did not say that axes were good
weapons.”
The quotation is correct, but my paraphrase is not. The passage on page 313reads:
Gerstacker felt their [the frontier settlers’] most notable skills were those related to
farming. He noted that they were very “expert” at the use of axes, “which they begin to
wield as soon as their arms are strong enough to use them,” adding that axes make very
good weapons.
Gerstaecker did not literally “add” that axes were good weapons, the correct choice of
words should have been, and will be, “finding.” Gerstaecker discovered the utility of axes
during his hunts in America, the very next paragraph in Arming Americagives one such exam-
ple (citing Gerstaecker pp. 266–67). Gerstaecker also used an axe to dispatch a wolf. This crit-
icism implies but does not state that my portrayal of an axe as a useful weapon is inaccurate.
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mend the book to those interested in this issue: Carl P. Russell, Firearms, Traps, & Tools of the
Mountain Men (New York, 1967), 232–311.
13Ole Rynning
“Another misquote comes with Ole Rynning’s account, which stated that
guns should be brought west for self-defense, a point [Bellesiles’] ignores.”
I believe that my use of this quotation is correct, especially as Ole Rynning does not state,
as the criticism implies, that a gun was in any way necessary for self-protection, nor does he
provide any examples to that effect. Rynning does, however, talk elsewhere about the useful-
ness of having European goods for exchange which is the point of this paragraph.33However,
I grant that the clause in question, “partly for personal use,” should be inserted for greater
clarity, and that change has been made in the second edition of Arming America.
My larger argument in this section is that most travelers never witnessed the tales of vio-
lence they heard. Rynning makes no reference to violence, and found the American “easier to
get along with than the Norwegian, more accommodating, more obliging, more reliable in all
things. . . . Since it is so easy to support oneself honorably, thieving and burglary are almost
unknown,” though he does make an exception for “the infamous slave traffic.”34Rynning, like
so many travelers, found violence focused on the slaves, and even predicted civil war over the
issue. Also like many other travelers, Rynning was struck with the emphasis Americans who
lived outside the South placed on education: “he spares nothing in the instruction and educa-
tion of his children.”35He even adds that there is nothing to fear from the Indians; “these peo-
ple are very good-natured, and never begin hostilities when they are not affronted.”36 Like so
many other visitors, Rynning thought America was all about work and prosperity. 
56 Michael Bellesiles“Yet I admit that here, as is so often the case, there is always reason to still be
in doubt.”
—Leopold von Ranke1
M
ost historians insist that evidence may be compelling without being cer-
tain. It seems that I failed to make apparent the complexity and tenta-
tiveness of my historical inquiry. Arming America came across to some people as making
claims for a definitiveness that would be alien to any work of history, especially one that
acknowledges that it is a preliminary exploration of a new field. Albert Camus saw the
essence of human frustration in the contradiction between the desire for certainty and the
irrational nature of the world.2 There are those who rest their very identity on the notion of a
certain, unchanging past. The vision that society is unalterable is not just incorrect, it is dan-
gerously undemocratic, and as such should be of concern to every modern historian.
Leon Goldstein sees history consisting of a superstructure, “that part of the historical
enterprise which is visible to non-historian consumers of what historians produce,” and an
infrastructure, “that range of intellectual activities whereby the historical past is constituted in
historical research.”3 History is often perceived as little more than a chronicle, the plain
recording of a sequence of facts, each total and complete unto itself. Such a perspective fosters
the notion that historians devote themselves solely to acquiring facts and reporting them. In
the case of Arming America, the manuscript came in at over one thousand pages, requiring the
elimination of great amounts of material, entire careful accounts and considerations of the
details of firearm technology and numerous other issues. As a result, many criticisms focus on
exactly what has been cut, as though a failure to devote thirty pages to the distinctive styles of
musketry in the eighteenth century negates the entire work. Obviously there is much more to
be said on this subject and no book can hope to say it all—every writer on every subject must
make hard decisions on what to include and what to cut. But that fact does not mean that
every book written is an artifice for failing to cover every detail of a subject. 
Perhaps we should make a better effort at sharing with a wider public the workings and
advantages of historical analysis. Those new to historical writing often assume that each foot-
note leads the reader to a repetition of the wording that is in the chronicle. Yet footnotes gen-
erally refer to the precise evidence being discussed; much of that discussion is often based on
an appreciation for what lies in the total context of the archives, the provenance of the docu-
ment under consideration, the biographical details of the author or authors of that document,
Conclusionand, hopefully, an informed analysis of its larger meaning. Or as Ranke said, footnotes are not
enough, we must ask the right questions.4
Most of the criticisms of Arming America seem to focus on the American Revolutionary
period. Very little has been said about the seventeenth or nineteenth centuries, roughly three-
fourths of the book. For instance, I know of only one criticism of my handling of the War of
1812, none of the Mexican War and Civil War. There are whole areas of inquiry that have not
been subject to criticism, though I know from the various e-mail lists that nearly every foot-
note in Arming America has been checked for accuracy. Almost nothing has been said about
my portrayal of the attitudes of the political leadership, or the technological development of
firearms, or government efforts to promote gun production and use, or the collapse of the
militia in the nineteenth century, or the growth and nature of the hunting subculture and the
revival of the militia in the mid-nineteenth century. Nor do I know of any criticisms of my
examination of law and politics in the colonial period or the nineteenth century, or of the
nature of crowd actions at any time. It is intriguing that most of the accusations against this
book are concerned with probate records and the period immediately preceding the articula-
tion of the Second Amendment. 
Arming America rests on many pillars. It was my intention to offer as many different
approaches to the subject as possible, to provide the reader with several different ways of
approaching the book’s argument. Perhaps I erred in making it too complex in this regard,
and some critics have suggested that it would have been far better had I abbreviated much of
the first half of the book and focused just on the last fifty years of the story.5My reasoning was
that this book approached what I felt to be a previously undeveloped area of history and that it
was therefore my responsibility to open up the subject for further research as much as possi-
ble.There are errors in Arming America, as in every book. Every effort has been made to cor-
rect flaws in this book, and a great deal of time has been devoted to discovering that many
charges of error are incorrect. The honest scholar realizes the probability of mistake and
remains open to further correction and suggestion. Ultimately history is not a science, but the
product of fallible humans (and even some physicists hold that science is not a science, but also
the product of subjective human actions and understandings). If we insist that all mistakes
and errors of judgment are indicators of fraud, we would very soon cease publishing. 
My former colleague Deborah Lipstadt not only wrote on the ability of dedicated ideo-
logues to manipulate popular misperceptions about history, but also had a closer encounter
with that attitude than she appreciated. Her book Denying the Holocaust is an important study
of the ability of Holocaust deniers to weave a sequence of lies, half truths, careful misquoting,
and subtle language into a denial of one of the most carefully documented acts of evil in his-
tory. For the Holocaust deniers, disagreements among scholars over the precise number of
Jews killed serves as evidence that historians are making it all up. Negative evidence is key to
the deniers’ case, as they label the Holocaust “impossible,” requiring organizational skills
beyond German capacities, and it was “impossible” to air out the chambers between poison-
ings. When David Irving sued Deborah Lipstadt for libel (because she would not sue him), it
became necessary to prove that the Holocaust was possible and had occurred.6 Dozens of his-
torians were put to work recreating years of scholarship to prove that the Nazis did what they
say they did. Along the way the press often got it wrong, framing Irving’s lawsuit as “the
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ing’s lies were on trial.The case record makes that clear. Many reporters actually reversed the
case, seeing Irving as the defendant.7
One of the most intriguing aspects of this whole affair was the need for historians to
demonstrate that when they disagree it is not because the event did not exist. It was necessary
to show that history is not “just the facts,” and that those facts are well known. Similarly, just
because the findings of one scholar disagree with those of another does not mean that either is
“wrong,” it just indicates that they looked at different sets of information and that now the
task is to figure out the meaning of the comparison. Because two historians read the same
source document differently does not indicate that either is attempting to falsify the records; it
means that they are doing their job and attempting to decipher the “foreign land” of the past.
Read any ten books on the American Revolution and you will find ten distinctive views of
that event. If that were not the case, then Mercy Otis Warren would have had the last word on
the subject and there would be far fewer books.
In Isaiah Berlin’s recently published notebooks the following passage occurs and seems a
fitting conclusion to this discussion:
Few things have done more harm than the belief on the part of individuals or groups. . . .
that he or she or they are in sole possession of the truth: Especially about how to live, what
to be & do—& that those who differ from them are not merely mistaken, but wicked or
mad: & need restraining or suppressing. It is a terrible and dangerous arrogance to believe
that you alone are right: have a magical eye which sees the truth: & that others cannot be
right if they disagree.8
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